confined his efforts to the reorganization of the army. After consultation with Colonel Dorrego, who commanded the advanced posts, he determined to confide these positions to the district militia and to concentrate his Regular forces in Tucuman. In carrying out this plan he received most valuable assistance from the devotion of the country people, who masked all his movements and prevented the enemy from discovering anything either of his intentions, or of his strength.
His first step was the construction of an entrenched camp to the north of the city, which put a stop to desertion, and he increased the number of his troops by recruiting. Here he stood on the defensive and limited his efforts to aiding the popular movements in Salta, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz de la Sierra.
In this entrenched camp, which is known to history as the citadel of Tucuman, he established a school of instruction, holding up the mounted grenadiers as a model for the rest of his force. Belgrano was a most docile pupil, but Dorrego, though his talents were highly esteemed by San Martin, was sent off to Santiago del Estero for insubordinate conduct. Belgrano soon afterwards left the army, giving as his last advice to his friends the maxim, "that war must be waged not with arms alone but with the force of public opinion," which maxim was at that time exemplified by facts, for the Royalist armies held only the ground on which they stood, and their movements were paralyzed by the popular insurrections all around them.
In the Province of Salta the revolutionary movement was most pronounced. The first popular manifestation in the city produced the organization of the civic militia. In 1810 the urban guard was raised by the voluntary enlistment of youths of respectable families. Then arose spontaneously among the peasants of the campaña, a corps of cavalry, with the instincts of the Cossacks, and the qualities of the Mamelukes, headed by a chieftain who made his name famous for deeds of prowess.
