CHAPTER XV.
THE FIRST CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH OF CHILE.
1817.
After the victory of Chacabuco, San Martin made three mistakes, two of mere detail, but one of importance, which had an evil influence upon his later operations. The campaign which ought to have finished immediately was thus prolonged, and he was compelled to fight four more battles to accomplish the reconquest of Chile, retarding by three years the prosecution of his great enterprise.
On the 12th February he remained encamped on the field of battle instead of pursuing the enemy at least to the end of the plain of Chacabuco. The following day, instead of marching upon the capital he ought to have pursued the fugitives to Valparaiso. By this mistake 1,600 veteran troops escaped to Peru, to act against him later on. But his great mistake consisted in his neglect to secure the fruits of his victory by an immediate campaign in the South. The military strength of Chile lay in the South — the people were warlike, the royal cause had there many partisans, and the country was full of strong military positions, in especial the fortress of Valdivia, backed by the islands of Chiloe, a sea-port by which reinforcements from Peru could be poured into the country. Looking far ahead, the victor of Chacabuco overlooked that which was close at hand.
Ordoñez was an officer of great talent, who up to that
