"As corroborative of the views which have been already suggested, the memorialists would respectfully call the attention of congress to the history of the national legislation, under the confederation as well as under the present constitution, on this interesting subject. Unless the memorialists greatly mistake, it will demonstrate the sense of the nation, at every period of its legislation, to have been, that the prohibition of slavery was no infringement of any just rights belonging to free states, and was not incompatible with the enjoyments of all the rights and immunities which an admission into the Union was supposed to confer.
"The memorialists, after this general survey, would respectfully ask the attention of congress to the state of the question of the right of congress to prohibit slavery in that part of the former territory of Louisiana which now forms the Missouri territory. Louisiana was purchased of France by the treaty of the 30th of April, 1803. The third article of that treaty is as follows: 'The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of the citizens of the United States; and in the mean time they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which they profess.'
"Although the language of this article is not very precise or accurate, the memorialists conceive that its real import and intent cannot be mistaken. The first clause provides for the admission of the ceded territory into the Union, and the succeeding clause shows this must be according to the principles of the federal constitution; and this very qualification necessarily excludes the idea that congress were not to be at liberty to impose any conditions upon such admission which were consistent with the principles of that constitution, and which had been, or might justly be, applied to other new states. The language is not by any means so pointed as that of the resolve of 1780; and yet it has been seen that that resolve was never supposed to inhibit the authority of congress, as to the introduction of slavery. And it is clear, upon the plainest rule of construction, that in the absence of all restrictive language, a clause, merely providing for the admission of the territory into the Union, must be construed to authorize an admission in the manner, and upon the terms, which the constitution itself would justify. This construction derives additional support from the next clause. The inhabitants "shall be admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States.' The rights, advantages, and immunities here spoken of, must, from the very force of the terms of the clause, be such as are recognized or communicated by the constitution of the United States; such as are common to all citizens, and are uniform throughout the United States. The clause cannot be referred to rights, advantages, and immunities derived exclusively from the state government, for these do not depend upon the federal constitution. Besides, it would be impossible that all the rights, advantages,
