but that Germany would be prepared to take all that she can get in Africa and in the extreme East, and then by natural steps in Australasia and America.
But Pan-Germanism finds itself in a rather awkward position: its programme can be carried out only with the consent of at least Britain, France, and Russia. These three Powers present themselves, therefore, to the Pan-Germanist as obstacles in the way of a quite lawful and reasonable German development. Of these three Powers it would seem, to judge by Pan-Germanist literature, that Britain is honoured by Germany as her greatest and most formidable obstacle. Germany cannot close her eyes to the fact that England has always been a jealous upholder of the balance of power in Europe. Apart from any question of adherence to general principles, Britain is bound to adhere to that policy, even though it be for the reason that it is the most effective guarantor of her own self-preservation. Britain, too, is a supreme obstacle because she is the Power which dominates the sea, and until Germany herself dominates the sea her programme is unfinished. Then, again, Britain is the Power, of all others, which possesses the most extensive overseas dominions, from which Germany hopes one day to select for her own possession the best and most valuable. And yet again, Britain, besides being one of the chief of the three great financial Powers in the world, of which Germany herself is not one, is the great Power in Europe most interestedly representing the East. So long as Britain retains her Eastern interests, Germany's operations in the Balkans, Asia Minor, or it may be towards Egypt and in the Far East, are hampered most grievously.
France, too, is a formidable obstacle to this ambitious policy of Germany. Not only is she interested in the preservation of the balance of power in Europe, as in the maintenance of the general principles of international relations, but from the point of view of Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Holland, and Switzerland, she cannot tolerate passively any extension whatever of the territories of Germany towards the west. And, added to this, France must always be viewed by Germany, so long as the empire retains possession of Alsace and Lorraine, as a potential enemy who may at any moment strike a heavy blow in revenge for the events of 1870-1. France, like Britain, is also an obstacle in the path of Pan-Germanism because of her colonies and her financial position.
With regard to Russia, her position as an obstacle to the progress of the realisation of Pan-Germanism is a very simple one. She is the one great Slav State in Europe, and as such is the protector of the Balkans and of the Poles, Serbs, and other Slav
