than the actual expenses in the event they failed to succeed, and that we would get a very meagre compensation unless we succeeded in the actions. I think no conversation was ever had except Mr. Matthews stating that if we should succeed we should be well paid. I think he mentioned that once or twice."
It is not an unusual thing for lawyers to take cases they believe just, knowing that their compensation depends on their winning. Many clients with just cases would be deprived of counsel if they had to insure a fixed compensation, for not infrequently all that a client has is involved in a suit. The practice is so common among reputable lawyers that it certainly cannot be regarded as a proof of a conspiracy, unless there is a reason to suppose that they have taken a case of whose merits they themselves are suspicious. There is absolutely no evidence that Matthews's counsel were not convinced from the first that they had a strong case. Quinby, the district-attorney who tried the criminal case, certainly conducted it with a fire and a logic which nothing but conviction could have inspired. Moreover, it must be remembered that these attorneys never failed to convince the juries before whom they appeared of the merits of their case. Four juries, two grand juries and two petit juries gave unanimous verdicts of conspiracy against the defendants in the course of the litigation. A case backed by evidence which would convince such diversified bodies of men could hardly be called a speculation. Their claims were large, but lawyers are not proverbial for the modesty of their charges, and in the cases of Hatch and Moot, the two making the largest claims, the labour had been very great and had extended over long periods, as one can see who will examine the testimony published by the Derrick; and besides, exorbitant charges can hardly be construed as a proof of conspiracy.
This, then, in outline, is the history of the case on which are based all charges, so far as the writer knows, that the
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