Nothing reveals more clearly than this telegram that, at the very end of May, Lord Canning had but feebly grasped the situation. He had, it is true, realised the intense danger of the position below Dehlí, but no soldier himself, and having at his elbow men who were soldiers only in name, he had realised neither the difficulties which General Anson had to overcome before he could march from Ambálah, the strength of Dehlí, nor the extent of the disaffection. A more correct forecast would have made it clear to him that he had nothing to hope for from the Commander-in-Chief, that he had to depend solely upon God and his own right arm.
There was this advantage in the faultiness of his forecast that it made him confident. Those about him assured him that Dehlí could not hold out, and that the capture of Dehlí would be the turning point of the disturbances; and he believed them. Could he maintain the weak middle part, the unguarded country between Banáras and Dehlí, until succour from the North-west, from Persia, from China, from Burma, should arrive, all must go well. He had done what he could with the small means at his disposal to strengthen that middle part. On the 20th of May he had begun, and on following days he continued to despatch the 84th by driblets, as many as could be accommodated in a series of post-carriages, to Banáras and Kánhpur. On the 23d of May the Madras Fusiliers arrived from Madras, and were promptly despatched in the same direction. The first week of June increased his hopes that the danger might be yet averted. That week witnessed the arrival in Calcutta of the 64th Foot and 78th Highlanders from Persia, of a wing of the 35th Foot from Maulmein, of a wing of the 37th and a company of artillery from Ceylon. These were pushed forward with all possible celerity.
It is as certain as can be, judging from his after conduct
