arrangement with Jang Bahádur, Prime Minister and virtual ruler of the State of Nipál, for the despatch of a body of Gurkhá troops to the districts of Gorákhpur and Ázamgarh.
So far he had done well. But none of those acts, praiseworthy as they were, touched the crucial point. They did not provide immediate succour to Havelock. Yet at that moment, besides the 53d, which garrisoned Fort William, there was a wing of the 37th regiment available; the 10th Foot garrisoned Dánápur; whilst on the 5th of July, two days before Havelock started from Allahábád on his memorable campaign, the 5th Fusiliers, 800 strong, landed in Calcutta from the Mauritius.
Havelock, we have seen, wanted on the 5th August, according to his own estimate, another thousand men to enable him to reach Lakhnao. Now, on the 5th of July there were 1200 men available, either at Calcutta, or on their way, steaming towards Allahabad (for the wing of the 37th had been despatched just before) without weakening the garrisons of Calcutta and Dánápur. With a little management that number could have been considerably increased. We left Havelock, in the last chapter, on the 13th August, stranded at Kánhpur for want of such troops. Why, in the terrible crisis which interrupted his victorious career, were the troops which might have been available not promptly despatched to him?
To this question there is an answer, and that answer indicates the difference which arose between the Government and the rest of the European community, and with respect to which the Government adopted a course, timid, shrinking, and politically ruinous. For the sake of a sentiment they risked the temporary loss of the Empire. Indeed, it will be proved that but for the heroic conduct of one man, the late Vincent Eyre, the country between
