of fire. They knew not, apparently, the deadly result to the garrison of this mode of attack, for they displayed no continuity In the working of it.
On the 9th of October the garrison was cheered by the news of the complete success obtained at Dehlí, and of the successful march of Greathed's column as far as Bulandshahr. Then it was that, realising that Sir Colin Campbell's march to his relief had now become a question of three or four weeks, Outram set to work to devise a plan to communicate with him as he should approach. Already he had forwarded to the Álambágh a despatch for Sir Colin, containing plans of the city and the approaches to it, and his own idea as to the best mode of effecting a junction. But though written despatches might tell much, something more, something in the shape of personal communication with Sir Colin, by an intelligent man who knew every point of the position of the blockaded garrison, seemed to Outram to be almost essential. But how to secure to Sir Colin such personal communication? It could be accomplished only by one of the garrison, and by that one having recourse to disguise. But for a European to disguise himself, and to attempt to penetrate in that disguise the hostile masses which surrounded the blockaded position, which guarded every avenue, and carefully watched every approach, was apparently to court certain and ignominious death. No one could be asked to incur such a risk. Indeed, it would have required, on the part of Outram, a conviction that the chances of success were at least equal to those of failure to allow him to accept the offer of a volunteer.
The anxiety of Outram for some such personal communication was greater when he learned that Sir Colin was on the point of joining the force between the Álambágh and the Banní bridge, and there can be no doubt
