homes could well spare them a little longer. The destruction of the German Navy mattered nothing to Germany, who could build another fleet with her flourishing finances. Her army was in possession of Holland and the mainland of Denmark, and would remain so until the British Army—if there were any—arrived to turn it out. The British Government must state what indemnity it was prepared to pay to be rid of the war, or what surrender of territory it would make to obtain peace.
At the same time the German Press, in a long series of inspired articles, contended that, notwithstanding the ultimate British successes, England had been the real sufferer by the war. The struggle had been fought on British soil, British trade had been ruined, British finances thrown into utter disorder, and a great stretch of territory added to the German Empire. Holland and Denmark were ample recompense for the reverses at sea.
The British blockade of the German coast was derided as ineffective, and the British losses due to German mines were regarded as a sign of what the British Navy had to expect if it continued the war. Then a picture was painted of Germany, strong, united, triumphant, confident, firm in her national spirit, efficient in every detail of administration, while in England corruption, inefficiency, and incompetence were alleged to be supreme.
But these Press philippics and the haughty attitude of the German Government were, in reality, only attempts to impose upon the British people and the British Government. Subsequent information has shown that German interests had suffered in every possible way, and that there was grave danger of foreign complications. Unfortunately, the behaviour of the German Press had the expected effect upon England. The clamour for peace grew, and the pro-Germans openly asserted that a cessation of hostilities must be purchased at any price.
At the mediation of the French Government negotiations between the British and German Governments were resumed in the first days of November. But the
