REMINISCENCES OF A JURIS CONSULT.
51
In the earlier years of my professional career, before experience had taught those severe, but salutary lessons, which she alone can teach, I had communicated to a client, in the fulness of my own exultation, and in the first bloom of my self complacency at the discovery, a neat and cherished plan to overthrow the whole case of the other party. He, as indiscreet as his counsel, in half an hour afterward, having accidentally encountered his adversary, let out as much of my new born scheme, as sent that adversary to his attorney, who instantly so changed the form of his attack, as wholly to render inoperative the mode of defence on which I so plumed myself. My present client, however, was more prudent; at least I am not aware that he suffered any thing to exude to the detriment of his cause, which in due time presented itself before a jury.
The opening of the case alleged, as usual, the right of the plaintiff to a front on— street of one hundred ninety three feet,” commencing at a corner of Humphrey Collinson's ground,” and that the defendant had encroached, & c. In evidence were adduced the deeds of which I had before examined copies, and sundry old men, who, to all appearance, had survived their memory and all their other faculties, testified to what had always been held the corner of Collinson's lot, in the days of their youth. While these relics of antiquity were detailing their early reminiscences, I glanced over the deed from Onesimus Wharton to Ernest Obermeyer, and almost sprang from my chair at what I found there. Recovering, however, from this involuntary expression of surprise, I kept myself down to the level of a decorous attention to the slow coming facts of the aged witnesses, and bore without interruption their excursive flights from the matters in question merely ceasing to write down their testimony, when they indulged themselves in irrelevant recollections of the olden time. As the evidence for the plaintiff closed, the faces of the jury bore that air of puzzled candour — if I may so express myself which seems to indicate their entire comprehension of what has been laid before them, mingled with astonishment that facts, apparently so conclusive, should be controverted: joined, rather comically, with a noble resolution to hear the other side of the case. Feeling confident, however, that I knew more of the matter than they did, the jury's benevolent resignation of look only added to the amusement that I felt in anticipation of my certain triumph; so, putting on a sedate and modest cast of face, and addressing myself to what I knew were their secret thoughts, 1 began: “After the testimony and documentary evidence of the plaintiff, you are doubtless surprised that I should attempt the apparently hopeless task of unsettling your present firm persuasions. Such of you, however, as have been frequent occupants of a jury box, must recollect instances of entire revolution in your sentiments, when the seemingly irrefutable conclusions of one party have been met either by argument or fact that entirely reversed the whole character of the case, and left you to wonder at
your own precipitancy in so promptly and prematurely judging the merits of the controversy. Such a case will this prove we are prepared to show that the point or line which the old people examined have declared to be the corner or line of Collinson was not “the western line,” alluded to in the deeds of the plaintiff, but became his western line by a purchase of a strip of ground three feet eight inches in front, running parallel with his old line, and afterward conveyed to Onesimus Wharton, and forming part of the lot conveyed by him to Obermeyer for a pasture ground. We will farther show you that the defendant, if he had encroached on his eastern neighbour, is not liable therefor to the suit of Cuthbert Turner, the present plaintiff, who does not own a foot of ground in the lot he claims as his.” Breaking off thus abruptly, I had nearly smiled to see the look of wonder with which this assertion was received by the jury, who bent eagerly forward, their curiosity fully excited to hear the proof which I had promised them. A few old deeds and plots endorsed on them, with trees for corners, quite proved the first position which we had assumed, and demonstrated incontrovertably, the true corner of the original lot of Collinson. For the second, I laid hold of Wharton's deed to Obermeyer, a link in the plaintiff's chain of title, and read to the astonishment of all, and of none more emphatically than of my own client, the words of conveyance “to the said Ernest Obermeyer.” “To have and to hold the said lot or piece of ground, with the appurtenances, to him, the said Ernest Obermeyer,” and there stopt the important document in its description of what lawyers call “the quantity of estate granted.” To render this part of the case intelligible to the general reader, it must be explained, that to grant the fee simple, or any estate greater than for life, the word “heirs “in a deed is indispensable. Of course, the estate reverted to Onesimus Wharton or his heirs, immediately upon the decease of Obermeyer, who could not convey to Turner more than he himself had.
In reading over the record of this deed in the office, I had glanced carelessly over that portion of it which was now found so important, my attention being directed exclusively to The the starting point, so often alluded to. remainder of my narrative is soon told. The charge of the court and the verdict of the jury followed as matters of course, but I did not know until after the conclusion of the suit that my client was sole heir to Onesimus Wharton, and of course the owner of the lot on which he was said to have trespassed, and which, from the spread of the city, soon became of very considerable value.
S.
The present is an age of excitement — of theory and, of professed improvement. The great danger is, that the solid acquirements of our ancestors the results of their hard labour and patient investigation will be exchanged for the wide and endless projects of experiment.
