man must be presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts.' My contention is supported by the case of Rex z;s.Baru3,Hyndmanaai^Or3 which was tried by Justice Cave who in his charge to the Jury said :
'I am unable to agree entirely with the Attorney-General when he says that the real charge is that though these men did not incite or contemplate disorder yet as it was the natural consequence of the words they used, they are responsible for it. In order to make out the offence of speaking seditious words, there must be a criminal intent upon the part of the accused ; there must be words, spoken with a seditious intent; and although it is a good working rule to say that a man must be taken to intend the natural consequences of his acts, yet if it is shown from other circumstances that he did not actually intend them, I do not see how you can ask a Jury to act upon what has become a legal fiction. * * * * j]^Q maxim that a man intends the natural consequences of his acts is usually true, but it may be used as a way of saying that, because reckless indifference to probable consequences is morally as bad as an intention to produce these consequences, the two things ought to be called by the same name and this is at least an approach to legal fiction. It is one thing to write with a distinct intention to produce disturbance and another to write, violently and recklessly, matter likely to produce disturbances.'
Criminal intention cannot be presumed but must be positively proved by the evidence of surrounding circumstances. The motive of an act must not be con-
- Vol- i6, Cox's Criminal cases Page 365.
