mine own conscience satisfied, I would after that with all mine hart swere the principal othe to. To this I was answered, that thoughe the Kinge woulde giue me licens under his letters patent, yet wold it not serue against the statute. Wherto I said, that yet if I had them, I wold stand unto the trust of his honour at my parel for the remenaunt. But yet thinketh me loe, that if I maye not declare the causes without perill, than to leaue them undeclared is no obstinacye. My Lorde of Canterbury taking hold upon that that I saide, that I condempned not the consciences of them that swarye, said unto me that it apered well, that I did not take it for a very sure thing and a certaine, that I might not lawfullye swer it, but rather as a thing uncertain and doubtfull. But than (saide my Lorde) you know for a certenty and a thynge without dout, that you be bounden to obey your souerain lorde your King. And therefore are ye bounden to leaue of the dout of youre unsure consciens in refusing the othe, and take the sure waye in obeiying of your prince, and swere it. Now all was it so, that in mine own mind me thought my self not concluded, yet this argument semed me sodenly so suttle, and namely with such authorite coming out of so noble a prelates mouth, that I could again aunswere nothing thereto but only that I thought my self I might not well do so, because that in my consciens this was one of the cases, in which I was bounden that I shoulde not obey my prince, syth that whatsoeuer other folke thought in the matter (whose consciens or learning I wold not condempne nor take uppon me to judge) yet in my consciens the trouth semed on the tother side. Wherin I had not informed my consciens neither sodenly nor sleightlye, but by long leisour and diligent searche for the matter. And of trouth if that reason may conclude, then haue we a readye way to auoide all parplexities. For in whatsveuer matter the doctours stand in gret dout, the Kinge's commandement given upon whither side he list, soyleth all the doutes. Than said my Lord of Westminster to me, that how soeuer the matter semed unto mine owne minde, I had cause to fere that mine owne minde was erroniouse, when I se the gret counsail of the realme determine of my mind the contrary, and that therefore I ought to change my consciens. To that I aunswered, that if there were no mo but my selfe upon my side,
