have necessary cognitions in the sense of tendencies “implanted” in us “from elsewhere,” necessitated tendencies to judgment, which we merely follow as they coerce us, and if we can only “guess” or “have faith” that we are real and in real relation to others, then we are not free, and no genuinely idealistic system exists at all. The reader who cares enough to look as he should, will see that the scheme of proof for all my cardinal propositions consists in my reconsidering the whole question of a priori knowing, and vindicating its affirmative, in the light of all the objections really made to it since the enduring argument of Kant in its favour.
It is possible that this charge of omitting essential proofs was suggested by a somewhat incautious sentence in the original Preface, which I have now taken care to correct by a needed addition.[1] This read, “Proofs of this or that part of it [the new pluralistic theory of ultimate reality] are attempted in each paper, but no establishment of the system as such.” From this it was an easy, if inaccurate and unwarrantable inference, that only certain principles in the system were brought to scrutiny in the essays, while the rest were merely asserted for the sake of orienting the reader as to where he would find himself in the world of metaphysics if he once took Personal Idealism for granted. But such was far from being
- ↑ See p. xxvii.
