soul and soul, and between God and all other spirits; and he therefore declares it is too short to reach the object. Doubtless in this last point he is right: to say that the true and only causal relation between spirits is that of Final Cause, is of course but another way of saying that all spirits are causæ sui, or eternal, and hence is, instead of the proof, the proposition to be proved. But the proposal of this view of Final Cause as the ladder is no proposal of mine. I was quite amazed to read the reviewer’s words. It never occurred to me, in thinking out the system, nor in writing the essays, that this very important step of putting Final Causation at the root of the causal system was any part of the positive argument for the belonging of the individual to the eternal order. Doubtless it is an indispensable precursor of the proof, in the way of showing just what is to be proved; for if the relation of God to souls is that of their Efficient Cause, or literal Maker, they cannot be possessed of a real freedom, cannot be the genuine causes of their own acts and character; cannot belong, that is, to the eternal order at all. But to be an indispensable condition of a thing is far fro.n being the sufficient ground for it.
What, then, is the proof offered for this “stupendously audacious” proposition? Have I really offered none? The reviewer declares, that, despite the sundry improvements upon the monadology of Leibnitz which he is so kind as to say I have made, I have still “not cleared the essential objection to Leibnitz’s scheme” — the objection that it is “an indemonstrable[1] speculation, motived, indeed, by a noble interest, but a cathedral in the clouds.” Is this in fact the case?
It certainly is not. It would be strange indeed, if, com-
- ↑ Undemonstrated, I suppose is meant; to call the speculation indemonstrable, is of course to beg the question.
