quarter with adequate support, might have won no inconsiderable military distinction.
He had been well trained ; he was a good disciplinarian; he knew when and how to be severe, and he had formed some distinct idea of carrying on a campaign. Sir H. Clinton showed his incapacity by recommending desultory measures as a means of reducing the enemy. Cornwallis tells us that he was quite tired of 'marching about the country in quest of adventures.' He informs his Commander-in-Chief that the right maxim for the safe and honourable conduct of the war was 'to have as few posts as possible, and that wherever the King's troops are, they should be in respectable force.' He was in favour of offensive operations in Virginia only. He did not foresee the least advantage from destroying goods and property at Philadelphia. He thought it absurd to attempt to turn an unhealthy swamp into a defensive post, which could at once be taken by an enemy with a temporary superiority at sea. In fact, ho was for concentrating his efforts on operations in a province where a decisive victory would mean the defeat of his opponents; and at one time before the surrender of York Town we had firm possession of four important provinces, while another state, Vermont, had shown a desire for union with Canada. Our Loyalists had not then lost all heart, and the 'Americans were reduced to great straits for both money and supplies.'
In a very few years, however, the talents and
