precedent and a uniform rule of practice required us to give it. He had himself given peremptory instructions to our Resident at the Court of the Raja that he was "to abstain from recognising any adoption by means of which the childless Raja might desire to perpetuate the sovereignty, assigning to the Raja as his reason for withholding consent the absence of the sanction of the British Government." Sir George Clerk did not confound, as so many have done since, the right of adoption as conveying sovereignty with the right of adoption as conveying property, or as qualifying for the discharge of religious duties. He not only admitted but specially dwelt upon this distinction: "The adoption having taken place according to Hindu usage, there can be no doubt but that such adopted son is the late Raja's legal heir, and should succeed to all his personal property. The question, however, remains whether he is entitled to the Sovereignty of the Sátára Rajas."'
Sir George Clerk, before leaving Bombay, personally answered this question in the affirmative. But the Bombay Council, after full consideration, could not be brought to accept his opinion; and the succeeding Governor of Bombay agreed with his Council against the transfer of the government of Sátára to the adopted child. The Supreme Council of the Governor-General in Calcutta also decided that such an adoption could not carry
