sense (as Damascenus[1] says) that by 'image' is meant intellectual, free to choose, and self-potent to act. Therefore, after what has been said of the Exemplar God, and of those things which proceed from the divine power according to its will, there remains for us to consider His image, to wit, man, in so far as he is himself the source (principium) of his acts, possessing free will and power over them."
Thereupon Thomas continues, opening his first Quaestio:[2]
"First one must consider the final end (ultimus finis) of human life, and then those things through which man may attain this end, or deviate from it. For one must accept from an end the rationale of those things which are ordained to that end."
Assuming the final end of human life to be beatitude, Thomas considers wherein man as a rational creature may properly have one final end, on account of which he wills all that he wills. Quaestio ii. shows that man's beatitude cannot consist in riches, honours, fame, power, pleasures of the body, or in any created good, not even in the soul. Man gains his beatitude through the soul; but in itself the soul is not man's final end. The next Quaestio is devoted to the gist of the matter: what beatitude is, and what is needed for it. Thomas first shows in what sense beatitude is something increate (increatum). He has already pointed out that end (finis) has a twofold meaning: the thing itself which we desire to obtain, and the fruition of it.
"In the first sense, the final end of man is an increate good, to wit God, who alone with His infinite goodness can perfectly fulfil the wish (voluntas) of man. In the second sense the final end of man is something created existing in himself; which is nought else than attainment or fruition (adeptio vel fruitio) of the final end. The final end is called beatitude. If then man's beatitude is viewed as cause or object, it is something increate; but if it is considered in its beatific essence (quantum ad ipsam essentiam beatitudinis) it is something created."
Thomas next shows:
"... that inasmuch as man's beatitude is something created existing in himself, it is necessary to regard it as action (operatio).
