Page:The New Europe, volume 1.pdf/23

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PANGERMANISM AND THE EASTERN QUESTION

The spiritual father of modern Pangermanism, Lagarde, did not preach the formal annexation of Austria-Hungary. He would have been content if Austria became a colony, a hinterland of Germany, and if Trieste and the Adriatic were placed at Germany's disposal; for Trieste secured the waterway to Constantinople, to Asia, and to Africa, while Austria as a colony assured the land route. Lagarde, being no diplomatist, revealed his plan for the non-German nations of Germany and Austria without circumlocution; he threatened to make short work of the Czechs and Poles, and even of the Magyars. In short, to Prussia Pangermanism means above all else the possibility of squeezing the Austro-Hungarian lemon in Germany's interest.

The radical faction at Pangermans demanded the direct and formal absorption and annexation ot Austria-Hungary, or at least of Austria, leaving Hungary independent for the time being. These stalwarts were mostly Austrian, and it was especially against them that Bismarck's Austrophil pronouncements were directed. Bismarck's aim was the same, but he favoured different tactics; and it is very significant that the great War has converted them to the Bismarckian policy. One of their Austrian leaders, the Deputy lro, proclaimed this conversion in a striking pamphlet (Oesterreich nach dem Kriege). In spite of the Austrian victories (!), he openly declares that "we Germans in Austria are no longer able to hold out by our own strength," and therefore Austria-Hungary must be preserved by Germany's aid and for her benefit. Herr lro accepts Bismarck's policy as Pangerman, and argues that it is in the vital interests at Germany and at the German race to sustain Austria-Hungary as their faithful outpost.

Great Austria has always had the effectual backing of Germany, and the latter's attitude to the annexation of Bosnia in particular removed any lingering distrust which Austria might still have harboured in view of the direct rapprochement between Germany and Turkey. If Bismarck declared that the Balkans were a matter of indifference to Germany, he did so with the knowledge that Austria-Hungary was pursuing a German policy in the Balkans, but William ll. soon corrected Bismarck and concluded a close, though at the time only informal, alliance with Turkey. Vienna, her suspicions allayed by the ostentatious devotion shown by

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