THE IMPORTANCE OF SALONICA
criticism, and nowhere more so than in connection with the Salonica expedition; but the main criticism which might fairly be directed against them is that they listened so long to the advice of those who wished the Balkans to be aban- doned to the en my, that when at last they acted, they did too little, and did even that little too late. To suggest that because General Sarrail's forces have hitherto failed to cut Germany's route to the East they should be withdrawn altogether, is as absurd as to suggest that, because the Somme offensive failed to prevent the overrunning of Roumania, our Western policy is definitely bankrupt. The two argu- ments are based upon the same fallacy, whether we regard them from the military or from the political point of view.
"War," we are told, "is a business for soldiers and their trained minds," and we are left to assume by implication that civilians are not entitled to a say in military affairs and are sure to provoke disaster. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to find in history any instances of successful wars being conducted by mere soldiers to the exclusion of the politicians, though, of course, there have sometimes been supreme commanders like Gustavus, Frederick or Napoleon, who combined the military and political control in their own persons. All experience goes to show that the ideal combination in war is a clear political brain to direct and a strong military hand to execute; when the positions are reversed, a dangerous lack of balance ensues. It is for the statesmen of the country at war to prescribe their aims, to find generals capable of executing them, and to provide them with means adequate to the task. The Dardanelles Expedition is probably the most flagrant example in recent history of a political idea, essentially sound in itself but undigested and ill-thought-out, rashly imposed by politicians upon sailors and soldiers alike, under circumstances which rendered success extremely improbable. It is now notorious that saner counsels were overridden, and that the alter- native proposal which was then laid before the British Cabinet—the despatch of reinforcements to Serbia—might have averted subsequent disaster in the Balkans, main- tained Turkey in isolation from Germany, prevented Bulgaria from entering the war against us and given us the full benefit of Greek and Roumanian co-operation.
What is not nearly so well known is the fact that no less
grave miscalculations have been committed by the most
397
