7
friendship; but when Bismarck attached Austria, and consequently the Balkans, closely to Germany, and when William developed his Turkish and Asiatic policies, there was a growing estrangement from Russia. The result was that England came to an understanding with Russia and the four-fold Entente was born. The Pangermanists are divided; a part is looking upon Russia as the most dangerous enemy of the Germans, the others upon England; antagonism against Russia is found principally among the Baltic Germans, like Schiemann, Rohrbach, and others; the adversaries of England are Count Reventlow and his adherents. The Bismarckian policy toward Russia is advanced by Professor Hoetsch and many conservatives; Rohrbach offered a hand to the English against Russia.
The opponents of Russia point to Russia’s size and its tremendous population in the near future, drawing the conclusion that Russia is the true enemy of Germany. England, they argue, is separated from Germany by the sea, has no common frontier, is small in Europe, and its other parts are scattered throughout the world without practical centralization; its true strength is in the navy: it cannot therefore threaten Germany, for Germany will have a fleet to oppose that of England. Germany’s army, supplemented by the armies of Austria-Hungary, possibly of Italy, the Balkan States and Turkey, will be able to face Russia and France.
6. The rise and the course of the war were fully directed by the Pangerman policy. Austria-Hungary, as the German vanguard in the Balkans, attacked smaller Serbia and provoked thereby Russia; Germany was “obliged” to back its ally; Turkey and Bulgaria joined the two empires, and Pangerman Central Europe was organised in a military way. The defeat of Russia and Serbia was left to Austria; Germany planned to smash France with extreme rapidity, and before England could produce armies; that is the reason why the Germans invaded Belgium. The Germans did not expect the military participation of England, but there they were mistaken, just as they were mistaken about smashing France—they expected to be in Paris in a few weeks. They were also in error as to the military strength of Russia, they were ill-advised as to the Austrian army and its leadership, and they never expected that America would join the Allies. But in spite of that the Pangerman plan has been temporarily realised.
To-day, the German Central Europe has this shape:—Germany has 68 million people; it has under its control Austria-Hungary (51), Bulgaria (5½): and Turkey (21)—146 million. That figure alone is sufficient to enable Berlin to stand against Russia, which is the greatest state of Europe; Russia, to be sure, has 30 million more people, but its lack of railways, its paucity of population in tremendous territory, finally its backwardness in the economic, financial and cultural fields, gave German Central Europe a decided balance, not merely against Russia, but also against France. Germany occupied Belgium (6½), Northern France (6), Serbia (5), Montenegro (½); in Russia it holds the Baltic Provinces, Poland with Lithuania and the Ukraine, about 60 million. Germany therefore controls 224 million people; where it cannot employ their military strength, it exploits their economic and financial strength. In addition she exploits Finland and to a large extent Russia itself. Russia, being strategically weakened by the revolution, concluded a disgraceful and dishonourable peace—the Schiemanns and Rohrbachs reached temporarily their aim. Reventlow hopes with so much more reason that he, too, will reach his aim. Germany with its central Europe has had from the very beginning of the war the advantage of centralisation and unified organisation of all its powers; in addition to that, Germany was prepared strategically and politically (the plan and aim of the war), whereas the Allies were unprepared, unable to unite their scattered forces, and had no clear and common plan such as gave the initial strategical advantage to Germany-Austria. Austro-Germany had and has a definite plan, carefully and elaborately prepared in true Pangerman fashion; from William down to the officers and soldiers every combatant aims at the same thing, knows why he is fighting—and such a preparedness of programme is a great military force. It is true that the
