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IV.—WAR TO THE END.
23. The Necessity of War to the End in the Interest of Permanent Peace.
THE PROBLEM OF THE WAR.
53. The democratic organisation of Europe on the basis of the self-determination of nations pre-supposes an integral victory of the Allies; unless defeated, Prussian Germany and Prussianised Austria-Hungary will not become democratic, will not permit the democratic organisation of Eastern Europe and will stem the longed-for development of all Europe. Austrian and Hungarian ministers declared plainly that they were opposed to the national principle; that is proved, too, by their manceuvres—they are interested in the maintenance of the dynasty and their robber state. Germany, to be sure, supports nationalities when she finds it of advantage to do so, but at home she rejects the self-determination of Alsace-Lorraine, of the Poles, Danes and others. The true character of Prussianism and Austrianism thus stands out very plainly.
In the interest of permanent peace it is therefore necessary to carry on the war till the end. That does not mean to accept Prussian militarism: we merely demand defence, an energetic and thorough defence.
Defence is psychologically and morally quite different from attack; the muscular activity is the same in both, but the motives, the entire mental attitude, are quite different. Every act is judged in ethics by its motives, and therefore the defensive war is morally admissible and necessary. Offensive, aggressive war is inadmissible, immoral. Tolstoy’s judgment of war is incorrect, in fact his doctrine of non-resistance is incorrect, unnatural, inhuman, under the aspect of humanity, because it prepares victims for men of violence. Truly human ethics demand resistance, everywhere, always, against all evil. Humanitarianism cannot condemn the defensive war, it only condemns the war of aggression.
This attitude, I believe, sufficiently refutes the charge of militarists that democracy in condemning aggressive war leads to passivism and weakening of energy.
The militarists object that it is impossible to decide correctly, when war is aggressive and when it is defensive; they claim that the historians have not settled that question even as to wars that were fought out long ago, to say nothing of the present war. Every war may be immoral, so the Prussian militarists will admit after the manner of Jesuits, and therefore one should not introduce questions of morality into it. All this is absolutely false: historians of Prussia, and of lands where there is no political freedom, cannot solve the controversy; that much is true; and it is true also that certain historians have not the ability for it. But free men of judgment, accustomed to scientific exactness, are able to settle the difference with due exactness. That is true of this war also. Every man sees the difference between defence and attack; all peoples in the world make the distinction between killing in self-defence and murder.
Many pacifists place a wrong valuation on the war. War is an evil, a great evil, but if we judge by the final effect and the loss of lives and health, it is not the greatest evil: alcoholism, for instance, is probably responsible for as many victims as wars; then there are the effects of syphilis, factory accidents, etc., which are equally harmful to individuals and to society; the immense number of suicides (in Europe about 100,000 annually) shows clearly that war is not the worst or the only evil, servile life is worse.
Then, of course, there are different ways of conducting war—a bashi-bazouk also makes war; but war in accordance with the Geneva convention is different. The Germans and Austrians have not adhered to this convention and have introduced inhumane methods of warfare; one cannot call them barbarian, because they are planned, the result of that
