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V.—THE NEW EUROPE.
25. Democratic Peace and its Terms.
SUMMARY.
55. Not merely the inborn instinct of self-defence, not merely national sympathies and antipathies, but historical and political insight, constrain the Czecho-Slovaks to accept the program of the Allies and to reject the program of the Central Powers.
On the side of the Allies there are found the principal democratic and civilized states, especially the two oldest republics; their opponents—Prussia-Germany, Austria, and Turkey—represent the obsolete, mediæval monarchic states, the oldest reactionary forms of theocratic absolutism. On the side of the Allies is the whole world; the Central Powers are morally isolated. The aims of these monarchies are aggressive, militaristic; the aims of the Allies are defensive, pacifist. The German program is anti-national; the program of the Allies is based upon the recognition of the rights of all nations, small and great. The program of the Allies is democratic; the program of the Germans is aristocratic.
The German aims were put into an elaborate system by Pangermanism, and they were followed by the Central Powers in this war politically and strategically.
Pangermanism aims at a German, German-led Central Europe, the substance of which is formed by Prussian Germany with Austria-Hungary; this latter Empire played in the Pangerman scheme only the rôle of a German colony, a bridge to Asia. Austria-Hungary is the vanguard of Pangermanism in the Balkans and on toward Turkey. Through Turkey Berlin aims at Asia and Africa.
In the West the Pangermans endeavour to control some neighbouring lands, such as Holland, Belgium, the Scandinavian countries and parts of France and Italy; but the principal concern of Pangermanism is to keep the control of Austria-Hungary and, through it, of Turkey and of the Balkans.
Pangermanism, for centuries pushing towards the East, is now first of all anti-Slav (anti-Czech, anti-Polish, anti-Serbian) and anti-Russian; the weakening of the Slavs and Russia is the first stage of the Pangermanist program; the Slavs and Russia block the road of the Germans to Asia. That is the reason why the Czecho-Slovaks provoke the hatred of the Pangermans. The further plans of Berlin are directed against England and America: the dominion in Asia and Africa is to secure for Berlin the dominion over the West and the entire world.
To overcome the peril of Pangermanism the Allies need determination, energy and co-operation, not merely during the war, but also after the war. The principal task is to compel the German nation to rely on its own strength and to make it impossible for the Germans to exploit the neighbouring non-German nations, especially the smaller nations occupying the zone between the Germans and the Russians. That means to liberate and unify the smaller Slav nations, the Czecho-Slovaks, Poles, Jugoslavs and Ukrainians. The Latin nations, the Rumanians and Italians, must also be liberated and united, and the Allies must at the same time give their full attention and help to the regeneration of Russia.
This national self-reliance of the Germans will be established only if Austria-Hungary is divided into its component national parts. Austria is the principal assistant and accomplice of Prussia and Prussian Germany.
Hence the tactics of Berlin and Vienna in their peace moves to demand the status quo, that is to say, the preservation of Austria-Hungary and Turkey. In fact, it would not be the status quo ante: Austria was saved by Germany from Russia and Serbia and is now only nominally independent—the Habsburgs leaning on their German and Magyar subjects became the obedient servants of the Hohenzollerns. The German nation, the second
