BISMARCK-SCHONHAUSEN. 122 BISMARCK-SCHONHAUSEN. found in Bismarck a minister daring enouf:;!! to govern without a budget and witliout Parlia- mentary majority. In this manner hegan tlie lifelong alliance between King William and his great minister. 15isn]arck now entered upon his life-work, the uniliealion of Germany under Prussian leadership, and the placing of the new Cermany in the forefront of European nations. In pursuance of this object he develo])ed a thor- oughly consistent and often ruthless ])olicy, and carried it out without hesitation. Speaking to the Budget Commission of the Prussian Diet, September 30, 18(12, he said: "Our blood is too hot; we are fond of bearing an armor too large for our small body. Germany does not look to Prussia for liberalism, but for power. Let Bavaria, Wiirttemberg, Baden, in- dulge in liberal ideas; no one will assign them the role destined for Prussia. Prussia must con- solidate its might and nurse it for the favorable moment. Prussia's boundaries as determined by the Congress of Vienna are not conducive to its welfare as a sovereign .State. Not by speeches and resolutions of majorities are the mighty problems of the age to l)e solved — that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849— but by blood and iron." This much misimderstood statement, so char- acteristic of Bismarck, concisely summarizes the subsequent development of German history. Its full significance is elucidated by Bismarck in his Autohio;iru]ihy. Bismarck disliked war, but he saw no way of bringing the jealous German States together except through war. He re- garded it as indispensable to drive .Austria, as an essentially non-German and anti-national State, out of the Confederation, and he utilized the Schleswig-Holstein afi'air (see Schleswig- Holstein) to antagonize Austria and finally to force an issue between that power and Prussia. At the same time he made Prussia the champion of the demand for a national German Parliament baaed on popular suffrage. This seemed so at variance with his earlier political course that Germany found it diflicult tr> believe in his sin- cerity. Nevertheless, it was entirely consistent with the development of his character and opin- ions. He gained .ustria over to his views in the Schleswig-Holstein matter, and with her co- operation entered upon the war against Den- mark (181)4). He won the confidence of Italy, formed an alliance between that State and Prus- sia, and when the Schleswig-Holstein contro- versy came to a crisis in the (Jennanie Diet, Prussia was ready for action. On .Tune 1, 1800, Austria referred the scftlement of the (piestion to the Diet, and on Jime 10 Bismarck addressed to the German courts a letter setting forth Prussia's national policy. The following day Austria moved in the Diet for federal executi(m against Prus- sia, and the tie vote was decided in the affirma- tive, whereupon the rei)resentative of Prussia presented his Government's plan for a new na- tional organization, declared the Confederation dissolved l)y its own action, and withdrew. Prus- sia at once invaded the (Jerman States that ad- hered to Austria, wliile the main Prussian army was pushed into Austrian territory. The brief and brilliant cani])aign (see Gehmany and Set,n Wekks' War) secured the first object in Bismarck's programme. The Peace of Prague exchuled .Austria from the German Confedera- tion, which was reorganized under a i)ermanent Prussian presidency as the North German Con- federation. It was still necessary to bring the South German States into the I'nion, to jirick the bubble of Napoleon lll.'s self-assumed leader- ship in European nlfairs. and to establish a more satisfactory western boundary for Germany by making tlie Eliine a truly (ierman river. ' Bi.s- inarck fenced an issue with Erance with the same relcntlessness and the .same certainty of result that had characterized the contest with Austria. The mistakes of the French dii)lomacy (see Beneoetti) were utilized to the full, and France was goaded into a war to which she was wholly luiequal. ( See Fraxco-German ".B.) Through- out the war Bismarck was at the side of his sovereign, evincing in the course of the peace negotiations extraordinarj' determin.alion and executive capacity. When on the 18th of .Janu- ary, 1871, King William of Prussia at 'ersailles accepted the title of Emperor of the new (ierman Empire, Bismarck's policy had been vindicated. Before this his triumph had been won by con- stant contention against the centrifugal teniien- cies of the old Germany and in s|)ite of the stead- fast hostility of a large section of the (ierman people. Now' he became a popvilar idol. On April 10 the te.t of the Imperial Constitution was promulgated, and Bismarck, now created a prince, became the first chancellor of the new Empire. His next task was that of organizing the internal affairs of Germany upim the new basis, and of developing an Imperial i)olicy worthy of a power of the first rank. There is no ministerial responsibility under the Inijierial Constitution of (iermany, nor is the parliamentary opposition organized as it is in the Unite<l States and ICngland. I'.l.-niarck never came to believe in the wisdom of ])opular nuijori- ties or control by a iiartisan Parliament. He saw the necessity of a jxipular basis for a strong government, but he believed above all in a strong executive. And the neeessily of German unity was always uppermost in his mind. The pronuil- gation of the doctrine of Papal infallibility by the Vatican Council of 1870 was oilious to him as tending to weaken the loyalty of the (ierman Catholics. In no sense intolerant of religions as such, he was opposed to any political religious organizations within the State, and he main- tained this position both as Prussian Minister and as Imperial Chancellor. In .Tanuary, 1873, he caised the introduction into the Prussian Diet of certain las to regulate the relations of Church and State. Thus was brought on the six-years' struggle with the Clericals, known as the liulturh-iiiiipl (q.v.), in which Bismarck made the great mistake of his career, carrying his measures so far that in the inevitable reac- tion he was forced to acknowledge a virtual defeat. Bisnnirck's position seems to have been simply that of defending the authority of the State against outside interfcrenee. In 1874. re- plying to a Catholic attack in the Prussian Diet, Bismarck staled his princijjlcs cli>arly, acknowl- edging his duty to ri'spe<-t the dognuis of the Catholic Church merely as dogmas, and add- ing: "If the doctrine of infalliliility be so in- leri)retcd as to lead to the establishment of an ecclesiastical imperium in imperio; if it lend to the nullification of the laws of this coun- try because unapproveil by the Vatican, I am naturally driven to assert the legitimate su- premacy of the State. We Protestants are under
