COMMON LAW. 218 COMMON K.ECOVEKY. point again becomes of force, unless there be an older unrescinded statute, in which case that re- vives. For a sketch of common-law courts, plead- ing, etc., .see Court; Ple.dikg; etc. BiBLiOGKAPllY. Con.sult: The commentaries of Blackstone, of Kent, of Stephen ( 13th ed., London. 1899). of llroom (9th ed., London, 1890) ; Coke, First Part of the Ivslilutes of the Laics of England: or a Comme-niary upon Little- ton (any edition) ; Pollock and Mailland, Uis- tory of the Laws of Enyland (2d ed., Boston, 1899) ; Stephen, History of the Crimin-al Law of England (London, 1883). For a statement of the elementary principles of the common law, consult: Robinson, Elementary Laio (Boston, 1882) ; Minor, Institutes of Common and Statute Lan- (2d ed., Richmond. 1876-79). COMMONPLACE-BOOK. A sort of scrap- book for jotting down memoranda, occasional thoughts, or ideas for subsequent development. Southey, Dickens, and Charles Reade, for ex- ample, kept commonplace-books of which they made much use. COMMON PLEA. Any civil action between individuals, as distinguislied from criminal pro- ceedings, or other cases where governmental mat- ters are involved. See Civil Action; Pbosecu- TIO". COMMON PLEAS, Court of. One of the great liistoric tribunals of the common law in England. It was instituted, as a separate juris- diction, in the reign of Henry HI., under the name of the Court of Conunon Bench, but its real origin lies further back, in the provision of Magna Charta that common pleas (com- munia placita) should no longer follow the King's Court (Curia liegis) in its wanderings over the kingdom, but should l)e held in a tixed place (Magna Charta. 1217, s. 17). The rapid rise in power and influence of the court held by the King in jjerson. or by his judges vho at- tended him. combined with the necessity of bringing all causes, whether of a public or pri- vate nature, to the attention of a constantly moving court, constitiited, for private suitors, a grave alnise. This was remedied b.v definitely establishing at Westminster, under the provision of the charter above referred to. a sufficient num- ber of justices and barons of the King's Court to hear the private causes (common pleas) which could not conveniently follow the royal prog- resses. From this beginning dow-n to the reform of the English judicature in 1875, the Court of Common Pleas at Westminster, as it was com- monly called, shared with the Court of King's Bench the greater part of the common-law juris- diction of England. As distinguished from the King's Bench, the Court of Common Pleas was, as its title would seem to suggest, the iiojiular and common court of the kingdom, having exclusive jurisdiction in all real actions, or suits relating to land, and in actions Ijetween private persons to try private rights : while the King's Bench was, for a long time at least, liniitcd to pleas of the Crown, i.e. public causes, and appeals from county courts and other inferior jurisdictions. This division of business thiew ujjon the Common Bench the great mass of litigation, so that Sir Edward Coke called it 'the lock and key of the common law,' and Sir Orlando Bridgman described it as 'the common shop for justice.' The court was composed of a chief justice and as many com- mon (or puisne) justices as the business of the court required. The number of these varied at dillerent puriods from four to eight. It was abolished by the Judicature Acts, 1873-7.'). See Curia Rkgis: Court ; E.xciiequer; King's Bench. The origin and history of the English courts of justice are concisely and accurately de- scribed by Inderwick, The King's Peace: A His- torical Sh-etch of English Law Courts (London and New York, 1 895 ) . COMMON PRAYEK-BOOK. See Pb.yer- BOOK. COMMON RECOVERY. At common law, a .mode of alienation, or process for conveying land, through the medium of a fictitious suit in the superior courts of law. There is no reason to doubt the tradition, to which Blackstone has given the weight of his authority, that this method of convc.vance was '"invented by the eccle- siastics to elude the statutes of mortmain." Be- ing incapable of taking land by feoffment or deed, there was notliing to prevent them from bringing a suit for the recovery of the land of a collusive donor, alleging that the title was in them, and if he, thereupon, made default, the judgment of the couit in their favor operated to vest the title conclusively in them. In form it was a judicial determination that they were the owners of the land as against the defendant. In effect it was a device for enabling the defendant to transfer his interest in the land to them. Blackstone says, further, that after the inven- tion of common recoveries they "were encour- aged by the finesse of the courts of law in 12 Edward IV. in order to put an end to all fet- tered inheritances, and bar not only estates tail, but also all remainders and reversions expectant thereon." This refers to the famous struggle between the great landowners, seeking to tie up their estates in their families by entailing them on their issue and making them inalienable, and the lawyers and law courts, who aimed, in the interests of public policy, to defeat the attempt. The statute Dc Bonis Conditionalibns (linown also as the Statute of Westminster II.), enacted by Parliament in 13 Edward I. (1285), provided that lands given to a man and the heirs of his body, known as conditional gifts, shovild not be alienable so as to defeat the inheritance of the issue therein nor so as to cut off the interests of those to whom the estate was to go upon the fail- ure of such issue. Several devices were tried to avoid the statute and break entails, hut none of Iheni was entirelv successful imtil the vear mentioned bv Black- stone, 12 Edward IV. (U73), when,' in the famous 'Taltarum's Case,' a common recover.v vas eni]iloyed for the purpose. This proved to be entirely successful in barring the claims of the heir u])on whom the lands were entailed, and. hy a subsequent development of the action, all remainders and reversions dependent upon the fee tail were also cut off. The process was too difficult and technical to be set forth at length here, but it may be briefly described as a collusive and fictitious suit, insti- tuted by the person to whom the fee was to be conveyed (called the demandant) against the one who desired to bar the entail and convey the hind (known as the tenant), by suing out a writ called a praecipe quod reddat, in which the de-
