lation of a State should be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons three-fifths of the whole number of slaves. The basis of apportionment fixed by the Constitution for the first enumeration was one Representative for every 30,000 inhabitants, with the proviso that each State should have at least one Representative. The first House numbered 65, and successive enumerations and apportionments have varied the number of Representatives as follows: in 1793, 105; 1803, 141; 1813, 181; 1823, 213; 1833, 240; 1843, 223; 1853, 233; 1863 (during the Civil War), 243; 1873, 293; 1883, 325; 1891, 357; 1901, 386. The basis of apportionment under the twelfth census (1900) is one Representative to every 194,182 inhabitants. This furnishes the following representation for the several States:
| Alabama | 9 |
| Arkansas | 7 |
| California | 8 |
| Colorado | 3 |
| Connecticut | 5 |
| Delaware | 1 |
| Florida | 3 |
| Georgia | 11 |
| Idaho | 1 |
| Illinois | 25 |
| Indiana | 13 |
| Iowa | 11 |
| Kansas | 8 |
| Kentucky | 11 |
| Louisiana | 7 |
| Maine | 4 |
| Maryland | 6 |
| Massachusetts | 14 |
| Michigan | 12 |
| Minnesota | 9 |
| Mississippi | 8 |
| Missouri | 16 |
| Montana | 1 |
| Nebraska | 6 |
| Nevada | 1 |
| New Hampshire | 2 |
| New Jersey | 10 |
| New York | 37 |
| North Carolina | 12 |
| North Dakota | 2 |
| Ohio | 21 |
| Oregon | 2 |
| Pennsylvania | 32 |
| Rhode Island | 2 |
| South Carolina | 7 |
| South Dakota | 2 |
| Tennessee | 10 |
| Texas | 16 |
| Utah | 1 |
| Vermont | 2 |
| Virginia | 10 |
| Washington | 3 |
| West Virginia | 5 |
| Wisconsin | 11 |
| Wyoming | 1 |
It is further provided by the Constitution that Representatives shall be at least twenty-five years of age and residents of the States in which they are chosen. They receive an annual salary, determined by Congress, the amount of which at present is $5000. The House of Representatives chooses its own presiding officer, called the Speaker, from among its members. In the process of time this has become an office of great power and importance, ranking, perhaps, next after that of the President in influence and authority. This aggrandizement of the Speaker of the House of Representatives has resulted from the control over legislation, which, as the leader of the dominant political party in the House and under the committee system which has come to prevail in Congress, he has gradually acquired. He does not, upon becoming Speaker, lose his right to vote or otherwise to participate in the proceedings of the House.
Under the Constitution the two Houses of
Congress have in most respects an equal voice
in legislation, the only important exception being
the requirement that all revenue bills shall
originate in the popular branch of the legislature.
Each House is made the sole judge of its the
elections, returns, and qualifications of its own
members, though the times, places, and manner of
holding elections for Senators and Representatives
are left to the legislatures of the several
States.
The ample legislative powers of Congress, which are enumerated in Sec. 8 of Art. I., and Sec. 3 of Art. IV. of the Constitution (q.v.). are limited by the veto power of the President. Every bill intended to have the force of law must be submitted to him, after passing the two Houses separately, and, if vetoed by him, will fail to take effect, unless passed a second time and by a two-thirds vote of each House. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days after it shall have been presented to him, it shall become a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless its return be prevented by the adjournment of Congress. The Constitution provides for an annual meeting of Congress on the first Monday in December unless a different date is duly appointed by law. The President is empowered by the Constitution to call an extra session of Congress or of either House.
In addition to their legislative powers, each of the two Houses of Congress is endowed by the Constitution with important functions in the government. The House of Representatives has the sole power of impeachment, and the Senate the exclusive authority to try impeachments. In addition to this, the Senate exercises, in conjunction with the President, important executive powers in the ratification of treaties and in the confirmation of his appointments to all important offices of the Government, including the members of his Cabinet, the judges of the Supreme and other Federal courts, and even officers of the army and navy.
In the century of national life which has just closed, the balance of governmental power has insensibly shifted from the Executive to the Congress, and in Congress from the Senate to the House of Representatives. The free exercise by the Senate of its power of refusing assent to the President's nominations to office, and the extreme development of the party system in national politics, have operated in a great measure to deprive the executive of the actual power of making appointments to office; while the popular character of the House, the absolute control exercised over its business by the Speaker and other leaders of the dominant political party, and the consequent unanimity and weight of its action, have given it a marked predominance in legislation. It is both more active and more influential than the Senate, notwithstanding the fact that its great size and the enormous volume of its business have deprived it of the character of a popular deliberative assembly.
Many acute observers see in these facts a curious reproduction in our history of recent British experience in the great art of self-government. They argue that the place of Parliament in the British system is being taken by Congress in ours, while the House of Representatives seems destined to assume the supremacy over the other organs of government which has been attained by the House of Commons in England. It is a well-known fact that the Cabinet in Great Britain, which is the virtual executive, is in fact a self-constituted committee, made up of party leaders, of the House of Commons; and it is generally assumed that our executive is placed by the Constitution in an impregnable position of independence. But the leaders of the House of Representatives have, to a considerable degree, assumed the same control over the legislation which is exercised in England by the Cabinet, and it is plausibly argued that it will require no great extension of Congressional power to reduce the constitutional executive in this country to the same position of nominal authority but real
