JUDGMENT. 316 JUDGMENT. tions, yet we may thiiik them as so combined. But we must remember that all e.xperieiiee is not peripherally originated. We have many experi- ences, e.g. of memory and of fanta.sy, which are centrally originated. In many such experiences combinations of objects take place puri passu with acts of judgment, but it is important to dis- tinguish between the formation, i.e. the conscious appearance, of such comliinations and the anal- ysis of them in judgment. X(i«. since we can thus distinguish between the formation and the analysis of combinations, we ought in the interests of clear thinking to avoid calling the formation by a name that historically has been the specific term to designate only this analysis. The word judgment therefore is improperly a])plied to the so-called acts of synthesis. .Judgment, strictly so called, never .synthesizes, but always analyzes; but that analysis always presupposes a synthesis, i.e. an appearance of a complex in consciousness. If, however, by .synthesis is meant an act of combining what at first appears out of combina- tion — a meaning which seems to jirevail in Kant's works — then analysis does not presuppose syn- thesis. Sometimes, it is true, elements appear tem])orarily apart from each other and then sub- sequently appear in combination; but this is not always the case, and it is convenient to use the word synthesis in the sense, not of a sul)se- quent C()ml)ination of elements at first se[)arate, but of a conscious apprcliension of elenu'nts in combination. Now the question arises: If s.vn- thesis thus deiined does not ahvays involve judg- ment, does it not always involve thought? The answer depends upon the meaning of the word thought. If one defines the term as Ilcgcl did, viz. as the consciousness of objects in relation, then of course by the very delinitinn the (piestion is answered allirmatively. If. on the contrary, one defines thought as I.otze did. viz. as a comjiaring and judging activity, then the question nuist be answered negatively. Lotze's polemic against Hegel on this point was due to an entire mis- understanding of Hegel's position. We may gather up the results of this discussion of the nature of the logical subject by saying that it is the complex object of thought recogniz<'d in the act of judgment as cfuitaining within its com- plexity the element functioning as predicate. The logical copula is the recognition of the fact that the element functioning as predicate is included within the complex functioning as subject. In other words, the copula of any judgment is that element in the act of judgment which difTeren- tiates it from a mere envisaging of a complex without analysis of it: it is the act of analysis of a recognized synthesis. ,
objection wiiicli at
first sight seems to bear hard against this descrip- tion of the function of judgment and of the ele- ments of judgment is that it reduces judgment to tautology. If we jvidge of 'the house which I saw yesterday and which was burned down this morning" that it did burn down this morning, we have made no advance, it is claimed. The objection, however, confuses loL'ieal thoiight with the verbal expression of it. Vnless there is some exceptional reason for repetition of the expres- sion of some distinct element in the complex object of thought, such repetition is idle. But when one judges of a complex ol)ject of thought that its complexity is constituted of certain features, this is not tautolog'. .
identity be-
tween the meaning of an assertion and the actual state of facts is not a tautology, but a truth. It will be observed that so far nothing has l)een said to theeti'ect that the subject is always a noun sub- stantive with its (puilitiers; the predicate, an adjective or .some adjectival word or phrase; while the copula is always some part of the verb to he. The reason for this omission is that such a statement so far as it is true is a nnitter of language, not of logic. But not all of it is true. Not to speak of languages in which there are no adjectives as distinct from verbs or from sul)- slantives, the copula is always expressed by the whole sentence, not by some part of the verb to be or it.s etpiivalents in other languages, except in those few cases where simie part of that verb is the whole sentence; e.g. est in Latin. The relation between judgments and concepts (q.v. ) may be stated thus: No concept can bo formed without an act of judgment. Such a con- cept as that of "eat.' for instance, is the result of jirevious judgments which recognized within certain complex objects of thought certain con- stant elements. The first objects of thought that appear in the history of any thinker are with- out doidit indiviilual percepts. Subsequently we have individual objects of memory, of imagi- nation, etc. The comparison of such objects with each otluT results, when they are alike, in a jnilgment which ju'edicates of these objects simi- lar qualities. Our concepts are such similar (pialitics or com|dexcs of qualities as arc thought to characterize various individual objects. Thus the concept 'cat' is that complex of qualities which, it is judged, characterize in conuuon the various individual cats. These conceptual ele- ments do not exist in consciousness in separation from the other qualities which go to make the individual percepts, remembered objects, etc. They are merely distinguished from these other qualities. A concept once formed by an act of judgment may be made the basis upon wbicli further judgmental operations are conducted. Thus once equi])ped with the concept 'cat.' a scien- tist may proceed to various zoiilogical judgments about feline characteristics which the ordinary man knows nothing about. Thus we see that con- cepts always result from judgments, but many judgments result from the fact that we have pre- viously formed concepts. .Judgment is related to reasoning in the following manner: Every judg- ment has some rcascm for itself, although the reason may not be stated in the expression of the judgment. As thought becomes more developed, judgments are made which are recognized as licing true because other judgments arc true. This complex inlellcetiial process in which a judgment is made and is likewise judged to rest upon the truth of some other judgment is called reasoning. Thus though every judgment has a reason, not every judgment is an element in the complex process of reasoning. .Judgments are usually divided into three classes, singular, particular, and universal. Sin- gular, or better individual, judgments are those in which the subject is some single object of thought, e.g. 'this cat.' Universal judgments are those in which the predicate is asserted to qualify not only the single object or the several similar objects which psychologically function as sub- jects, but (ill similar objects, though not pres- ent in consciousness at the time of judgment. Thus in the judgment 'All material bodies gravi- tate,' I may have in mind only the image of two
