KNOWLEDGE. 561 KNOWLEDGE. judgment on the particular before us, but we pronounce it upon all the particulars represented by the one particular ideationally (or percep- tually) present; and upon all these particulars not only us purlicuturs, but also as each vicari- ous. In other words, the whole meaning of the judgment is not exhausted in the fact that it is true of each particular to which it applies; there is also included in the meaning the recognition that because it is true of each particular, there- fore these particulars are not merely paitieiilars, accidentally (onnected by the incidence of the same judgment upon each of them, but are also particulars representing the identity found in each, which identity makes it possible to pass the same judgment upon all. That identity or community of character which justifies the in- clusion of all the particulars within the meaning of the same judgment is not something externally combined trilh the mere particularitj' of each. It is something in the particularity of each which makes it not a mere particular, but a vicarious particular, or, in other words, a particularization of a universal. Conversely we may say that all particular features are potential universals; i.e. though in some judgments particular features may function as particulars, still in other judg- ments these same features may function as uni- versals. The demand still presses upon us for justifica- tion of this fact ot universalization. Because particulars arc not mere particulars, but are unique variations of universals, there is no logical impropriety in 'universalizing' them; that is, in looking at their universal rather than at their unique aspect. We thus escape the difficulty which particularism cannot escape and cannot solve. For particularism begins by asserting that only particular judgments arc justified. Tliat is, it misinterprets the fact that all judgments, when real and not verbal, are based on envisaged particulars, into the error that all judgments are based on mere particulars. We have seen that if they were so based, then there would be no justifi- cation for the imiversality of judgment. There is, however, a bar to an indiscriminate univer- salization. It does not follow that because a par- ticular is a unique version of a universal, it is therefore a unique version of any universal you please. The problem now becomes one of con- crete justification of the actual universalization we make. Take an example: To-day, when the thermometer stood at 75 degrees Fahrenheit, and a dog was lying in my basement ; when the barom- eter was 2!). 70. and my child was playing with a toy engine: when the atmosphere was saturated with moisture and a tire alarm was ringing: when the wind was blowing from the north and I was writing at my desk, it began to rain. In this example I have of course given only a few of the indefinite number of manifold and various fea- tures which characterized the concrete sitinition at the time it began to rain. Each one of these features, being a particularized universal, may legitimately be universalized. But not every one of these features can be universally connected with rain. It is the business of the meteorologist to discover just which of (he particulars is so connected. lie can ilo this by careful induction (q.v.) from a snn'iciently wide experience. The laws of induction are the statements of the prin- ciples an investigator must follow in making correct generalizations. These laws do not jus- tify, they merely regulate, the process of gen- eralization. The nature of the material dealt with can alone justify the process, in that that nature is itself universal in one of its aspects. But it may l>e said in answer to this justifica- tion of generalization, that, while it is granted that particulars never appear in intelligent ex- perience as bare particulars, still the element of particularity can be traced to sense and that of universality to thought. Therefore, it is alleged, particularity is more real; it needs no justifica- tion because it is an inexpugnable datum; univer- sality, however, being a thought-i)roduct, bears the marks of artificiality common to all elabora- tions of raw material. Can the result of such elaboration, it is asked, claim with propriety to stand as representative of reality? Is reality not that which we do not make, but findV This is the attitude of many ejiislemologists. It would have much to recommend it if it could l>e con- sistently carried out. For there is no di)ubt that there is a real distinction between the matter which thought elaborates and the result of that elaboration. And yet that distinction must not be maintained in such a way as to invalidate the procedure which leads up to it. To say that .sense-elements are real and that thought-products are artificial is to assume that witlunit the process of thought the sense-elements authenti- cate themselves as real. "c have no experi- ential warrant for saying that mere sense can recognize itself as sense. Only beeati.se a careful, thoughtful discrimination has led us to the dis- covery that experience has at least two distinct features, viz. sense and thought, and also onl.v because thoughtful investigation leads us to iden- tify sense with reality par excellenee. can we assert that without sense there can be no reality. If, however, this assertion is cli;inged into the statement that sense is real and thought ficti- tious, then it becomes suicidal. It denies the validity of the thought-process which has led to the assertion, and thus leaves the assertion unfounded. Thought alone can discriminate, for instance, hallucinations from percei)lions : hence thought is indispensable to the recognition of reality: and the validity of the knowledge given by sense-reality stands or falls with the validity of thought-processes. This is a truth not suffi- ciently realized. We may not blow hot and cold upon thought — blow hot when we need thought to authenticate sense-reality; blow cold when, having got certainty as to sense-reality, we pro- ceed to freeze thought out. The validity and competency of thought is presupposed in the com- petency of any knowledge of reality. Therefore we may say that the validity of thought is the one thing which philosophical doubt may not con- sistently assail. This is not to say that any particular thought- process may not be scrutinized with a suspicion of its validity. It is merely to say that if any thought-process is to bo condemned, sentence is passed upon it by a jury of jieers. Only thoight may condemn thought. But how can thought con- demn thought? Only by exiimining its own pro- cedtire with a view to a.scertaining whether it is consistent. Xo extraneous standard is applied. Kven when we test the results of our thinking by comparing them with facts of sense-percep- tion, the final arbiter is thought, in that the sen- sible facts confirm or overthrow nothing, except in accordance with the demand for consistency,
