KECIPROCITY. EECIPKOCITY. war and subsequent negotiations with Spain lasted during the time that his reciprocity nego- tiations with the various countries were in prog- ress. After the United States had assumed con- trol of Cuba, it imposed upon the constitutional convention of the Cubans the so-called Piatt Amendment, which was passed, after much oppo- sition, partly on the strength of an alleged prom- ise made by President McKinley to a delegation of Cubans that, should the amendment be ac- cepted, he would secure a large tariff reduction for Cuban sugar exported to the United States. President Roosevelt attempted to fulfill this sup- posed promise by urging Cuban reciprocity upon Congress at the session 1901-02. A bill provid- ing for a mutual 20 per cent, reduction of duties on Cuban and American products was introduced in the House of Representatives, but met with strong opposition from those representing beet- sugar interests, which had sprung into promi- nence subsequent to 1890. These men charged that the advocates of reciprocity with Cuba were playing into the hands of the refining combina- tion, which, it was said, had bought largely of Cuban lands and was seeking to secure cheap raw material through reciprocity. As a compromise it was proposed to grant the desired reductions, provided that the protection accorded under the Dingley Act to the process of refining (sugar ■differential') should be revoked. Such an amend- ment was incorporated into the reciprocity bill and it was passed by the House. The Senate, however, olijected to the amendment and the bill was killed in committee. The autumn elec- tions (1902) strengthened the Administi-ation. During the recess a reciprocity treaty was nego- tiated with Cuba and placed before the Senate at the session 1902-03. Although nothing was then done, a special session of the Senate in the spring of 1903 passed the Cuban treaty. In its original form, it secured important reductions on American agricultural and manufactured prod- ucts exported to Cuba in return for the conces- sion of 20 ]5er cent, on Cuban imports to the United States, but the beet-sugar interests con- trived to have it amended by a clause providing that no reductions should be granted to any but Cuban sugar during the life of the treaty. This stipulation necessarily implied the destruction of all prospect of passing the other treaties nego- tiated by Mr. Kasson with South American coun- tries, inasmuch as these were largely based on sugar. Meantime, Secretary Hay had negotiated ( October- November, 1902) "a reciprocity treaty with Newfoundland whereby certain of our products were to be admitted to that colony in exchange for bait priileges for our fishing ves- sels in" Newfoundland ports. This treaty was pigeonholed during the session 190203. owing to the influence of New England fishing interests. During the years 1902-03 an unusually strong agitatfon for" reciprocity with Canada sprang up in the Northwest and" in New England. This was due to the growing need for cheap lumber, ores, and coal along the northern boundary of the United States. At the present time reciprocity in Europe has assumed a somewhat different form from that which has been developed in the United States. That is primarilv due to the interpretation put upon what is k-nown as the 'most-favored nation clause' in international agreements and which dif- fers from the meaning assigned to that clause in American diplomacy. According to European usage, treaties incorporating the "most-favored nation clause' assure to the signatory countries treatment as favorable as that granted to any other nation. Tariff' concessions made to others become at once common to all nations having "most-favored' relations with the country making such concessions. On the other hand. American statesmen have adhered consistently to the view that trade concessions offered by it to some other country need not become common to a third coun- try unless that third country grants concessions similar to those of the second coimtry. It has been noted that under the European view of the most-favored nation clause the reciprocity treaties adopted subsequent to 1860 inaugurated an era of ver.y free trade. This was terminated shortly after 1870, owing partly to the desire to increase national customs revenues, and partly to the hostilities engendered by war and political struggles. Elaborate tariff's were adopted by most European countries between 1870 and 1885. These gradually developed into two principal systems — that of "general or conventional' tariffs and that of "maxinnim and minimmu' tariffs. The former is the plan adopted by Germany, Austria. Swit- zerland, and Italy, while the latter is pursued by France, Russia. Spain, Norway, Greece, and Bra- zil. Under the general or conventional tariff' system, a higher schedule is applied to those countries which have entered into no special com- mercial arrangement, while another or 'conven- tional' tariff' is granted to those which receive favored-nation treatment. Under the maxinuim and minimum system minimum rates are given to most-favored nations, and the home produce is thus assured fixed protection. Maximum rates, or such others on such articles as the Executive may see fit, are enforced against nations not re- ceiving favored-nation treatment, and the Execu- tive is allowed to bargain with these other coun- tries for mutual tariff concessions. The latter system is of course more flexible than the general or conventional tariff. As against the.se methods, which might be regarded as general reciprocity, our reciprocity system must be placed in the light of a series of special bargains based on no systematic plan. Reciprocity in Europe to-day is represented by the network of commercial treaties existing under these two systems. These have become exceedingly complex and interde- pendent. Whereas the older notion of reciprocity seemed to be based on mutual concession, the essential idea of the policy to-day seems to be that of retaliation. A movement for higher and higher retaliatory duties .seems to be growing verv general in Kuro|je. while the introduction of such a system is vigorously urged in England, the classic couitri- of free trade. This is shown by Mr. Chamberlain's proposal in the early sum- mer of 1903 for an Imperial customs tariff, or reciprocity, union between the colonies and the mother country, which would simply mean lower colonial tariffs to English exports, in exchange for retaliatory English tariffs against foreign products competing with those of the colonies •The difficulty, of course, lies in the danger of making food dearer in Europe. It is to be ob- served that so soon as reciprocity becomeo gen- eral in scope it is indistinguishable on the one hand from the idea of tariff revision and reduc- tion, and on the other from that of tariff re- taliation. Wlien not general in scope it implies
