sults from a limited view of nature. Proclus says: “Our conduct, so far as pertains to what is universal, is right; but so far as it pertains to what is particular, is wrong;”[1] “The same thing, indeed, will be evil to particulars, but good to wholes.”[2] Spinoza follows suit gracefully and says: “Whenever, then, anything in nature seems to us ridiculous, absurd, or evil, it is because we have but a partial knowledge of things, and are in the main ignorant of the order and coherence of nature as a whole;”[3] and he considers that when we call anything bad, we are led astray by the imagination which always sees things imperfectly.[4]
Recall in this connection what has been said as to the perfection of the world.
According to the above position, as will be readily discerned, there is to God, who sees all things in their entirety and perfection, no evil. That Mrs. Eddy so teaches has been already sufficiently shown. Proclus says: “Wholes have a relation to parts different from that of parts to each other. To divinity therefore nothing is evil, not even of the things which are called evil.”[5] And Spinoza says: “In the language of philosophy, it cannot be said that God desires anything of any man, or that anything is displeasing or pleasing to him: all these are human qualities and
