of the law, coming under the title of crown pleas, excessive, but even if we compare them with those awarded in civil cases, where, according to the arbitrary division of lawyers, the injury only affects individuals, we shall find them not only unjust but even ridiculous. To thieve from the person a few shillings is a crime, which by our laws nothing can expiate but the death of the guilty. Yet to set fire to a field of ripe corn is but a misdemeanour entailing some petty punishment. According to the statutes 9 George I. c. 22.—31 George II. c. 42. found in the 18th century, it is capital either to break down the mound of a fishpond so that the fish escape, or to cut down a cherry tree, while if some greater knave detains the property of the starving widow, or naked orphan, nothing but restitution can be enforced. Can this be justice, can this be equity? Whatever may be pretended by some that the difference in frequency may require a different punishment, we hope all will agree with us in the negative. Amongst those however who maintain this doctrine of the frequency of a crime being a warrant for more severe punishment, even death, is Sir Mat. Hales, whom Blackstone denominates the great and good. He writes, "when offences grow enormous, frequent and dangerous to a kingdom, or its inhabitants, severe punishment and even death itself is necessary to be annexed to laws, in many cases by the prudence of legislators." But can the injustice of one allow or render fit the injustice of another? We remember hearing a master once say to his scholar, who brought as an excuse for a fault, the example of another—if he hung would you hang too—so, though men may have committed an enormous crime, are we to be allowed the commission of another, and because many chuse to commit a small crime, are we to be allowed to punish a small crime with death? This was the legislation of Draco. Sir Mat. Hales might be a great and good man, but certainly upon this subject he could neither have
