tion of the most serene King of Portugal, it follows from this, that supplication must be made to us by him, and if it is found to lie within his demarcation, he must receive it from us, and not we from him, in accordance with the said treaty, which being understood to the letter, as the ambassadors petition, thus proves and determines the question.
It was especially declared that we, in this reasoning, made no request of the King of Portugal. And inasmuch as we were the defendant we neither wished to, nor ought we to have any desire to assume the duties of the plaintiff, because if the King wished anything from us for which he should petition us, we were quite ready to fulfil in entire good faith all the obligations of the said treaty.
Furthermore it was declared that, supposing—which is not at all true—that the King of Portugal had found Maluco first, and that he should claim that we should restore it to him, asserting that he had been despoiled of it by our having taken possession of it on our own authority, when we should have petitioned and received it from him; or alleging that we did not disturb or trouble him in the possession of what he does not have, nor ever had in his possession, it was quite clear that the case was not comprehended in the said treaty. Neither was it provided for nor determined in the treaty, which was not to be extended, nor did extend to more than was expressly mentioned and set down therein, which it did determine. Rather this appeared to be a new case, omitted and unprovided for by the treaty, which must be determined and decided by common sense or common law.
Accordingly, since this matter was outside of the
