On each of these subjects he presents a concise statement of present conditions and tendencies, followed by his recommendations for change, reform, or suppression. In the army, the principal difficulty lies in the corps of officers, partly Peninsular and partly native or American, with Indian subalterns; these classes have almost nothing in common, and the latter are dangerously near to the Indians, or are spoiled by the tendencies of the country. Provision should be made, therefore, for sending officers from Spain to fill all posts of command. Instead of enlarging the military force, a central location (afterward indicated as Cavite) should be selected, and rendered impregnable to assault, in which the government and the Spanish population of Manila might be safe in any revolution or other dangerous emergency; Manila is not sufficiently fortified for such a purpose. The piracies of the Moros are ruining the islands; the only way to check them is to conquer Joló and Mindanao with a powerful expedition, and colonize them from the Visayas. The Indian villages are often much too large to be properly directed in either spiritual or civil matters, and should be made smaller, with stricter police patrol. Measures should be taken to authenticate and confirm the titles to landed property, which at present are confused and unreliable. Much harm is caused by the ignorance, unfitness, and immorality of the Indian and mestizo clerics; they not only neglect their priestly duties, but have dangerous tendencies to revolution; as soon as this is practicable, all such should be replaced by European friars. Bernaldez descants upon their virtues and their ability to rule the Indians well, and advises the government "to maintain as many religious as possible in the islands, and give them as much
