light of intelligence, but only the light of nature, whence is naturalism and materialism. If our materialistic philosophers would think as accurately as at times they speak, they would experience no difficulty in arriving at a consistent and satisfactory philosophy of causes.
The error of regarding electricity merely a condition of matter may be seen so clearly that there can not be so much as a doubt. Suppose, for the purpose, that electricity is a condition of matter. How, then, can the mere condition of matter, as that of a prime conductor or an electromagnet, operate on a body that is not in actual contact with it, as the prime-conductor does upon the pith balls suspended by threads, or as the electro-magnet does upon the iron filings? The condition of one body can not affect another body unless there is contact of substance or a medium of transference; yet electricity operates through as perfect a vacuum as can be made, without any perceptible variance. This could not be the case if electricity were merely a condition of gross matter. The secret cause of the insistence that it is a condition of gross matter lies in the endeavor to make materialism consistent with itself, for it assumes that matter always existed, at least in an unorganized form; but as organized matter now exists, and substances higher than ponderable
