Or praise, or beauty mix their partial claim
Where sordid fashions, where ignoble deeds,
Where foul deformity are wont to dwell,255
Or whether these with violation loath'd,
Invade resplendent pomp's imperious mien,
The charms of beauty, or the boast of praise.
Ask we for what fair end, the almighty sire
selves, or in the apprehension of the person to whom they relate: in the last-mention'd instances they both exist in the objects; in the instance from Aristophanes and Terence, one of them is objective and real, the other only founded in the apprehension of the ridiculous character.
The inconsistent properties must belong to the same order or class of being. A Coxcomb in fine cloaths, bedaubed by accident in foul weather, is a ridiculous object; because his general apprehension of excellence and esteem is refer red to the splendour and expence of his dress. A man of sense and merit in the same circumstances, is not counted ridiculous; because the general ground of excellence and esteem in him, is, both in fact and in his own apprehension, of a very different species.
Every ridiculous object implies sentiment or design. A column placed by an architect without a capital or base, is laugh'd at: the same column in a ruin, causes a very different sensation.
And lastly, the occurrence must excite no acute or vehement emotion of the heart, such as terror, pity, or indignation; for in that case, as was observed above, the mind is not at leisure to contemplate the ridiculous.
Whether any appearance not ridiculous be involved in this description; and whether it comprehend every species and form of the ridiculous, must be determined by repeated applications of it to particular instances.
Ask we for what fair end, &c.] Since it is beyond all contradiction evident that we have a natural sense or feeling of
