Page:The Proletarian Revolution in Russia - Lenin, Trotsky and Chicherin - ed. Louis C. Fraina (1918).djvu/441

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SOCIALIST AND IMPERIALIST DIPLOMACY
415

informed us that by maintaining such relations we would gratify an expressed wish of the German government.

A more intense German offensive on the Ukraine side would have been more threatening than the advance upon the side of Finland. Directly after the conclusion of the treaty of Brest the troops of the Central Soviet government were ordered to withdraw from Ukraine. The Soviet government was maintained within the borders of the Ukraine, which, after the second congress formed itself into the government of the independent Soviet Republic of Ukraine. After the German troops had occupied all points belonging to the Ukraine, they continued to advance still further in the direction of Moscow and even occupied the southern part of the Russian governments of Tversk and Woronesj.

Therefore, the question of determining a line of demarkation on the Ukrainian front, which would determine the limits of the German advance, was quite acute, especially on the front near Woronesj, where Germany first demanded the occupation of some districts, but later only the occupation of the Wologodski district, with the important strategic railroad junction of Woronesj. The question of the line of demarkation was closely connected with the question of cessation of hostilities, and this was the beginning of negotiations with the Ukraine.

On March 30, the Ukrainian Rada addressed us with the proposition to commence negotiations, and the German government repeatedly pointed to our obligations as laid out in the treaty of Brest to conclude a peace with the Ukraine. From our side, we proposed opening negotiations at Smolensk (between Moscow and Brest). Although we sent our proposition directly to the Rada in Kief, and also to Berlin, our proposition did not reach the Rada in Kief soon enough, and it was not until April 16th that the Rada sent us a courier with a note proposing to conduct the negotiations at Tversk (halfway between Moscow and Kief), to where our delegates rapidly departed.

The peace delegation of the Ukraine came but to Worosjby (half way between Twersk and Kief), but the constant hostilities made it impossible for the delegates to meet. At this time, the Kief Rada was displaced by the government of Skoropadski, and Germany insisted that the negotiation be transfered to Kief, where they commenced on May 22nd.

The first question to be acted upon was the question of an armistice. The most important question, however, was the determination of a line of demarkation. We had repeatedly in the past made the question of determination of the boundaries of the Ukraine a topic for discussion as we considered this matter as most important, having to reckon with far reaching consequences in case of an unfavorable conclusion.

On March 29, we received a telegram from the German assistant secretary Busche, in answer to our queries, explaining that the territory of the Ukraine was temporarily determined upon, nine governments being added to the Ukraine.

When the negotiations concerning an armistice started, the Ukrainians demanded much more. They demanded that the line of demarkation be extended further to the North and to the East, so that they occupy eight more districts. They wanted especially the government of Woronesj, making fourteen districts, with a population of three million, to be given them.