between the state of things at the commencement of the war, and the state of things in 1810; and have shewn what was the amount of excess of currency in the latter period, making a just allowance for the difference of the necessary demand for currency in the two periods. This was, however, omitted to be done: nothing of the kind was attempted; and excess of issue, the stalking-horse of the day, was assumed, but never proved. We feel confident however, that our satisfaction upon this point will not be long delayed, when we contemplate the abilities and impartiality of those who are employed in the present investigation.
It is certainly to be acknowledged, as a general position, that dandis datis money prices will be in an inverse ratio to the quantity of circulating medium: but if the quantity of value to be circulated increases, and the quantity of circulating medium only increases proportionably, prices will not be affected at all.
It is now then satisfactorily demonstrated, that the circulation in 1810, so far from being excessive, was to an almost incredible degree less in proportion to the taxes to be paid and the income circulated, than in 1790, before the war. For—
In 1790, the taxes were about 17 millions, the currency in which they were paid, 25 millions in Gold, and 10 millions in Bank Notes.—In 1810, the taxes amounted to above 64 millions, and the currency by which they were payable consisted of 23 millions of Notes, and about 7 millions of Gold.—Thus in 1790, taxes were to currency as 17 to 35; when in 1810, taxes were to circulation as 64 to 32.
If we take in the private Bank Note circulation, and extend our comparison to the whole income of Great Britain,—suppose 10 millions the amount of private Notes in 1790, and 25 millions the amount of privateNotes