Page:The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 Volume 2.djvu/34

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30 I?ECOKD$ OF THE FEDEI?AL CONVENTION T?day MADISON election of the Executive Magistrate by the people. ? the example o� Poland where an Election o� the supreme Magis- trate is attended with the most dangerous commotions. The cases he observed were totally dissimilar. The Polish nobles have resources & dependents which enable them to appear in forces and to threaten the Republic as well as each other. In the next place the electors all assemble in one place: which would not be the case with us. The zd. argt. is that a majority of the people would never concur. It might be answered that the concurrence of a majority of people is not a necessary principle of elections nor required as such in any of the States. But allowing the objection all its force, it may be obviated by the expedient used in Masts. where the Legislature by majority of voices, decide in case a majority of people do not concur in favor of one of the candidates. This would restrain the choice to a good nomination at least? and prevent in a great degree intrigue & cabal. A particular objection with him agst. an absolute election by the Leglslre. was that the Exec: in that case would be too dependent to stand the mediator between the intrigues & sinister views of the Representatives and the general liberties & interests of the people. Mr. Pinkney did not expect this question would again have been brought forward; An Election by the people being liable to the most obvious & striking objections. They will be led by a few active & designing men. The most populous States by combining in favor of the same individual will be able to carry their points. The Natl. Legislature being most immedi- ately interested in the laws made by themselves, will be most attentive to the choice of a fit man to carry them properly into execution. Mr. Govr. Morris. It is said that in case of an election by the people the populous States will combine & elect whom they please. Just the reverse. The people of such States . cannot combine. IF their be any combination it must be among their representatives in the Legislature. It is said the people will be led by a few designing men. This might �happen in a small district. It can never happen throughout the continent. In the election of a Govr. o� N. �ork? it some-