Page:The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 Volume 2.djvu/59

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RECORD? OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION Thursday MADISON July temptation to court a re-appointment. If he should be re-appointable by the Legislature, he will be no check on it. His revisionary power will be of no avail. He had always thought & contended as he still did that the danger appre- hended by the little States was chimerical? but those who thought otherwise ought to be peculiarly anxious for .the motion. If the Executive be appointed, as has been deter- mined, by the Legislature, he will probably be appointed either by joint ballot of both houses, or be nominated by the I st. and appointed by the 2d. branch. In either case the large States will preponderate. If he is to court the same influence for his re-appointment, will he (not} make his revisionary power. and all the other functions of his administration subservient to the views of the large States. Besides- is there not great reason to apprehend that in case he should be re-eligible, a false complaisance in the Legislature might lead them to continue an unfit man in office in preference to a fit one. It has been said that a constitutional bar to reappoint- ment will inspire unconstitutional endearours to perpetuate himself. It may be answered that his endeavous can have no effect unless the people be corrupt to such a degree as to render all precautions hopeless: to which may be added that this argument supposes him to be more powerful & dangerous? than other arguments which have been used, admit, and consequently calls for stronger fetters on his authority. He thought an election by the Legislature with an incapacity to be elected a second time would be more acceptable to the people that the plan suggested by Mr. Govr. Morris. 7 Mr. King. did not like the ineligibility. He thought there was great force in the remark of Mr. Sherman, that he who has proved himself to be most fit for an Office, ought not to be excluded by the constitution from holding it. He would therefore prefer any other reas6nable plan that could be sub- stituted. He was much disposed to think that in such cases the people at large would chuse wisely. There was indeed some difficulty arising from the improbability of a general See further Appendix A, CCXII.