and undue influence, it was thought better to alter it. And the power of trying impeachments was lodged with this Body as more likely to be governed by cool and candid investigation, than by those heats that too often inflame and influence more populous Assemblys.
S 4. It was thought expedient to vest the Congress with the powers contained in this Section, which particular exigencies might require them to exercise, and which the immediate representatives of the People can never be supposed capable of wantonly abusing to the prejudice of their Constituents— Convention had in Contemplation the possible events of Insurrection, Invasion, and even to provide against any disposition that might occur hereafter in any particular State to thwart the measures of the General Government on the other hand by an Assembly once a Year Security is Annually given to the People against encroachments of the Governments on their Liberty.
S 5. Respects only the particular privileges and Regulations of each branch of the Legislature.
S 6. That the attendance of Members in the General Legislature at a great distance from their respective abodes might not be obstructed and in some instances prevented either by design or otherwise in withholding any Compensation for their Services, Convention thought it most adviseable to pay them out of the General Treasury, otherwise a representation might some times fail when the Public Exigence might require that attendance—Whether any Members of the Legislature should be Capable of holding any Office during the time for which he was Elected created much division in Sentiment in Convention; but to avoid as much as possible every motive for Corruption, was at length Settled in the form it now bears by a very large Majority.
S: 7. Much was also said on the Priviledge that the immediate Representatives of the People had in originating all Bills to create a Revenue: It was opposed by others on the Principle that, in a Government of this Nature flowing from the People without any Hereditary rights existing in either Branch of the Legislature, the public Good might require, and the Senate ought to possess powers coexistive in this particular with the House of Representatives. The Larger States hoped for an advantage by confirming this priviledge to that Branch where their numbers predominated, and it ended in a compromise by which the Lesser States obtained a power of amendment in the Senate—The Negative given to the President underwent an amendment, and was finally restored to its present form, in the hope that a Revision of the Subject and the objections offered against it might contribute in some instances to perfect
