nicious, on conscience that is often brutal prejudice, on faith that is often bigotry, on emotion that is the blindest of all guides; and if he does good or if he does evil, the power responsible for his deeds will not be a truly moral impulse. To gain the moral ends of humanity, the indispensable prerequisite is therefore the moral insight in its merely formal aspect, as an human power and as an experience of life. When a good many more men have reached the possession of this power, then more of life will be taken up with concrete duties. Until that time comes, the great aim must be this formal and provisional one: to produce in men the moral mood, and so to prepare the way for the further Iniowledge of the highest good. If we put the matter otherwise we may say: The moral insight, insisting upon the need of the harmony of all human wills, shows us that, whatever the highest human good may be, we can only attain it together, for it involves harmony. The highest good then is not to be got by any one of us or by any clique of us separately. Either the highest good is for humanity unattainable, or the humanity of the future must get it in common. Therefore the sense of conununity, the power to work together, with clear insight into our reasons for so working, is the first need of humanity. Not what good thing men may hereafter come to see, but how they shall attain the only sense whereby they can ever get to see the good, is the great present human concern.
Starting with this duty, we can now examine what rule of life this duty will give us. Extend the moral insight among men, and in thy own life:
