CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION; RELIGION AS A MORAL CODE AND AS A THEORY.
Auch bezweifl’ ich, dass du glaubest,
Was so rechter Glaube heisst,
Glaubst wohl nicht an Gott den Vater,
An den Sohn und heil’gen Geist.
Intending in the following pages to sketch certain
philosophic opinions that seem to him to have a
religious bearing, the author must begin by stating
what he understands to be the nature of religion,
and how he conceives philosophy to be related to
religion.
We speak commonly of religious feelings and of religious beliefs; but we find difficulty in agreeing about what makes either beliefs or feelings religious. A feeling is not religious merely because it is strong, nor yet because it is also morally valuable, nor yet because it is elevated. If the strength and the moral value of a feeling made it religious, patriotism would be religion. If elevation of feeling were enough, all higher artistic emotion would be religious. But such views would seem to most persons very inadequate. As for belief, it is not religious merely because it is a belief in the supernatural. Not merely is superstition as such very different from
