THE REMINISCENCES OF CARL SCHURZ
article on the Eleventh Corps at Chancellorsville to the “War Series” of the Century Magazine, he sought to sustain the impression that the troops, rather than their commander, were chargeable with the disaster. He had nothing better to say than: “We had not a very good position, it is true, but we did expect to make a good strong fight should the enemy come.” Not a very good position, forsooth! As if there could be a worse and more absurd position than one presenting flank and rear unprotected to the enemy! As if anyone had a right to expect a “good strong fight” with the certainty of being telescoped and wrecked in every possible way! “Should the enemy come!” As if the general commanding had not been most pointedly warned, again and again, that the enemy most surely was coming! General Howard, in that article, said further: “General Schurz was anxious.” This is true. I was anxious, indeed. And it would have been much better for the corps, for the whole army, and for himself, had General Howard been as anxious as I was. But General Howard does not say that I explained to him again and again why I was anxious, and that I most urgently warned him of the things which would come, and which actually did come. He did not emphasize that I was not only anxious, but also right. He positively denied having received General Hooker's “Howard and Slocum” despatch, warning him, of the danger threatening his right, which I had personally read and delivered to him; and then he adds: “But Generals Schurz and Steinwehr, my division commanders, and myself, did precisely what we should have done, had that order come.” This again is a misstatement, for, as my official report explained, I proposed entirely to withdraw the corps from its exposed position fronting south, and to form it fronting west, on the eastern side of the Dowdall clearings proposition which General Howard rejected. To
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