45. Mr Blair told the Inquiry that, until 11 September 2001, the UK had a policy of containment, but sanctions were eroding.[1] The policy was "partially successful", but it did not mean that Saddam Hussein was "not still developing his [prohibited] programmes".
The impact of 9/11
46. The attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 changed perceptions about the severity and likelihood of the threat from international terrorism. They showed that attacks intended to cause large‑scale civilian casualties could be mounted anywhere in the world.
47. In response to that perception of a greater threat, governments felt a responsibility to act to anticipate and reduce risks before they turned into a threat. That was described to the Inquiry by a number of witnesses as a change to the "calculus of risk" after 9/11.
48. In the wake of the attacks, Mr Blair declared that the UK would stand "shoulder to shoulder" with the US to defeat and eradicate international terrorism.[2]
49. The JIC assessed on 18 September that the attacks on the US had "set a new benchmark for terrorist atrocity", and that terrorists seeking comparable impact might try to use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear devices.[3] Only Islamic extremists such as those who shared Usama Bin Laden's agenda had the motivation to pursue attacks with the deliberate aim of causing maximum casualties.
50. Throughout the autumn of 2001, Mr Blair took an active and leading role in building a coalition to act against that threat, including military action against Al Qaida and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. He also emphasised the potential risk of terrorists acquiring and using nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, and the dangers of inaction.
51. In November 2001, the JIC assessed that Iraq had played no role in the 9/11 attacks on the US and that practical co‑operation between Iraq and Al Qaida was "unlikely".[4] There was no "credible evidence of covert transfers of WMD‑related technology and expertise to terrorist groups". It was possible that Iraq might use WMD in terrorist attacks, but only if the regime was under serious and imminent threat of collapse.
52. The UK continued actively to pursue a strengthened policy of containing Iraq, through a revised and more targeted sanctions regime and seeking Iraq's agreement to the return of inspectors as required by resolution 1284 (1999).
- ↑ Public hearing, 21 January 2011, page 8.
- ↑ The National Archives, 11 September 2001, September 11 attacks: Prime Minister's statement.
- ↑ JIC Assessment, 18 September 2001, 'UK Vulnerability to Major Terrorist Attack'.
- ↑ JIC Assessment, 28 November 2001, 'Iraq after September 11 – The Terrorist Threat'.
