875. A government must prepare for a range of scenarios, not just the best case, and
should not assume that it will be able to improvise.
876. Where the UK is the junior partner and is unable during planning or implementation to secure the outcome it requires, it should take stock of whether to attach conditions to continued participation and whether further involvement would be consistent with the UK’s strategic interest.
877. Public statements on the extent of the UK’s ambition should reflect a realistic assessment of what is achievable. To do otherwise is to risk even greater disillusionment and a loss of UK credibility.
878. Departmental priorities and interests will inevitably continue to diverge even where an inter‑departmental body with a cross‑government role, currently the Stabilisation Unit (SU), is in place. Therefore, co‑operation between departments needs continual reinforcement at official and Ministerial levels.
879. The Head of the SU must be sufficiently senior and the SU enjoy recognition inside and outside government as a centre of excellence in its field if the Unit is to have credibility and influence in No.10, the National Security Council, the Treasury, the FCO, DFID and the MOD, and with the military.
De‑Ba’athification
880. After the fall of a repressive regime, steps inevitably have to be taken to prevent those closely identified with that regime from continuing to hold positions of influence in public life. The development of plans which minimise undesired consequences, which are administered with justice and which are based on a robust understanding of the social context in which they will be implemented, should be an essential part of preparation for any post‑conflict phase. This should include measures designed to address concerns within the wider population, including those of the victims of the old regime, and to promote reconciliation.
881. It is vital to define carefully the scope of such measures. Bringing too many or too few individuals within scope of measures like de‑Ba’athification can have far‑reaching consequences for public sector capacity and for the restoration of public trust in the institutions of government.
882. It is also important to think through the administrative implications of the measures to be applied and the process for their implementation.
883. The potential for abuse means that it is essential to have thought‑through forms of oversight that are as impartial and non‑partisan as possible.
