Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/54

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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

In that respect, I don’t think toppling Saddam Hussein is germane to the long‑term ambitions of some terrorist groups to use them.”[1]

353.  Asked specifically about the theory that at some point in the future Saddam Hussein would probably have brought together international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in a threat to Western interests, Baroness Manningham‑Buller responded:

“It is a hypothetical theory. It certainly wasn’t of concern in either the short‑term or the medium‑term to my colleagues and myself.”[2]

354.  Asked if “a war in Iraq would aggravate the threat from whatever source to the United Kingdom”, Baroness Manningham‑Buller stated that that was the view communicated by the JIC Assessments.[3]

355.  Baroness Manningham‑Buller subsequently added that if Ministers had read the JIC Assessments they could “have had no doubt” about that risk.[4] She said that by the time of the July 2005 attacks in London:

“... an increasing number of British‑born individuals ... were attracted to the ideology of Usama Bin Laden and saw the West’s activities in Iraq and Afghanistan as threatening their fellow religionists and the Muslim world.”

356.  Asked whether the judgement that the effect of the invasion of Iraq had increased the terrorist threat to the UK was based on hard evidence or a broader assessment, Baroness Manningham‑Buller replied:

“I think we can produce evidence because of the numerical evidence of the number of plots, the number of leads, the number of people identified, and the correlation of that to Iraq and statements of people as to why they were involved ... So I think the answer to your ... question: yes.”[5]

357.  In its request for a statement, the Inquiry asked Mr Blair if he had read the JIC Assessment of 10 February 2002, and what weight he had given to it when he decided to take military action.[6]

358.  In his statement Mr Blair wrote:

“I was aware of the JIC Assessment of 10 February that the Al Qaida threat to the UK would increase. But I took the view then and take the same view now that to have backed down because of the threat of terrorism would be completely wrong.


  1. Public hearing, 20 July 2010, pages 23‑24.
  2. Public hearing, 20 July 2010, page 24.
  3. Public hearing, 20 July 2010, page 31.
  4. Public hearing, 20 July 2010, page 33.
  5. Public hearing, 20 July 2010, pages 33‑34.
  6. Inquiry request for a witness statement, 13 December 2010, Qs 11c and 11d page 7.
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