alliance founded not on emotion, but on a hard‑headed appreciation of mutual benefit. The benefits do not by any means flow only in one direction.
374. In his memoir, Mr Blair wrote:
“... I agreed with the basic US analysis of Saddam as a threat; I thought he was a monster; and to break the US partnership in such circumstances, when America’s key allies were all rallying round, would in my view, then (and now) have done major long‑term damage to that relationship.”
375. The Government was right to weigh the possible consequences for the wider alliance with the US very carefully, as previous Governments have done. A policy of direct opposition to the US would have done serious short‑term damage to the relationship, but it is questionable whether it would have broken the partnership.
376. Over the past seven decades, the UK and US have adopted differing, and sometimes conflicting, positions on major issues, for example Suez, the Vietnam War, the Falklands, Grenada, Bosnia, the Arab/Israel dispute and, at times, Northern Ireland. Those differences did not fundamentally call into question the practice of close co-operation, to mutual advantage, on the overall relationship, including defence and intelligence.
377. The opposition of Germany and France to US policy in 2002 to 2003 does not appear to have had a lasting impact on the relationships of those countries with the US, despite the bitterness at the time.
378. However, a decision not to oppose does not have to be translated into unqualified support. Throughout the post‑Second World War period (and, notably, during the wartime alliance), the UK’s relationship with the US and the commonality of interests therein have proved strong enough to bear the weight of different approaches to international problems and not infrequent disagreements.
379. Had the UK stood by its differing position on Iraq – which was not an opposed position, but one in which the UK had identified conditions seen as vital by the UK Government – the Inquiry does not consider that this would have led to a fundamental or lasting change in the UK’s relationship with the US.
380. This is a matter of judgement, and one on which Mr Blair, bearing the responsibility of leadership, took a different view.
381. The second reason for committing unqualified support was, by standing alongside and taking part in the planning, the UK would be able to influence US policy.
382. Mr Blair’s stalwart support for the US after 9/11 had a significant impact in that country. Mr Blair developed a close working relationship with President Bush. He used this to compare notes and inject his views on the major issues of the day, and it is clear from the records of the discussions that President Bush encouraged that dialogue and listened to Mr Blair’s opinions.
