basis, including the full record of the discussion on Iraq in Cabinet on five key occasions pre‑conflict, and policy advice to Ministers which is not normally disclosed.
Collective responsibility
392. Under UK constitutional conventions – in which the Prime Minister leads the Government – Cabinet is the main mechanism by which the most senior members of the Government take collective responsibility for its most important decisions. Cabinet is supported by a system of Ministerial Committees whose role is to identify, test and develop policy options; analyse and mitigate risks; and debate and hone policy proposals until they are endorsed across the Government.[1]
393. The Ministerial Code in place in 2003 said:
“The Cabinet is supported by Ministerial Committees (both standing and ad hoc) which have a two‑fold purpose. First, they relieve the pressure on the Cabinet itself by settling as much business as possible at a lower level or, failing that, by clarifying the issues and defining the points of disagreement. Second, they support the principle of collective responsibility by ensuring that, even though an important question may never reach the Cabinet itself, the decision will be fully considered and the final judgement will be sufficiently authoritative to ensure that the Government as a whole can properly be expected to accept responsibility for it.”[2]
394. The Code also said:
“The business of the Cabinet and Ministerial Committees consists in the main of:
395. Lord Wilson of Dinton told the Inquiry that between January 1998 and January 1999, in the run‑up to and immediate aftermath of Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 (see Section 1.1), as Cabinet Secretary, he had attended and noted 21 Ministerial discussions on Iraq: 10 in Cabinet, of which seven had “some substance”; five in DOP; and six ad hoc meetings, including one JIC briefing.[3] Discussions in Cabinet or a Cabinet Committee would have been supported by the relevant part of the Cabinet Secretariat, the Overseas and Defence Secretariat (OD Sec).
