The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
427. It would neither be necessary nor feasible to seek a mandate from Cabinet at
each stage of a discussion. That reinforces the importance of ensuring Cabinet is kept
informed as strategy evolves, is given the opportunity to raise questions and is asked to
endorse key decisions. Cabinet Ministers need more information than will be available
from the media, especially on sensitive issues of foreign and security policy.
428. In 2009, three former Cabinet Secretaries[1] told the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution:
“... each of us, as Secretary of the Cabinet, has been constantly conscious of his responsibility to the Cabinet collectively and of the need to have regard to the needs and responsibilities of the other members of the Cabinet (and indeed of other Ministers) as well of those of the Prime Minister. That has coloured our relationships with Number 10 as well as those with other Ministers and their departments.”[2]
429. Lord Turnbull told the Inquiry that Mr Blair:
“... wanted a step change in the work on delivery and reform, which I hope I managed to give him. Now ... how does the Cabinet Secretary work? You come in and you are – even with the two roles that you have, head of an organisation of half a million civil servants and in some sense co‑ordinating a public sector of about five million people. You have to make choices as to where you make your effort, and I think the policy I followed was not to take an issue over from someone to whom it was delegated simply because it was big and important, but you have to make a judgement as to whether it is being handled competently, whether that particular part is, in a sense, under pressure, whether you think they are getting it wrong in some sense, or they are missing certain important things.”[3]
430. The responsibility of the Cabinet Secretary to ensure that members of Cabinet are fully engaged in ways that allow them to accept collective responsibility and to meet their departmental obligations nevertheless remains.
Advice on the legal basis for military action
431. The Inquiry has reviewed the debate that took place within the Government and how it reached its decision.
432. The circumstances in which it was ultimately decided that there was a legal basis for UK participation were far from satisfactory.
433. It was not until 13 March 2003 that Lord Goldsmith advised that there was, on balance, a secure legal basis for military action.
