obligations imposed by the UN; and that it was important to agree to the return of UN inspectors to Iraq.
508. The focus on Iraq was not the result of a step change in Iraq’s capabilities or intentions.
509. When he saw the draft paper on WMD countries of concern on 8 March, Mr Straw commented:
“Good, but should not Iraq be first and also have more text? The paper has to show why there is an exceptional threat from Iraq. It does not quite do this yet.”[1]
510. On 18 March, Mr Straw decided that a paper on Iraq should be issued before one addressing other countries of concern.
511. On 22 March, Mr Straw was advised that the evidence would not convince public opinion that there was an imminent threat from Iraq. Publication was postponed.
512. No.10 decided that the Cabinet Office Overseas and Defence Secretariat should co‑ordinate the production of a “public dossier” on Iraq, and that Mr Campbell should “retain the lead role on the timing/form of its release”.
513. The statements prepared for, and used by, the UK Government in public, from late 2001 onwards, about Iraq’s proscribed activities and the potential threat they posed were understandably written in more direct and less nuanced language than the JIC Assessments on which they drew.
514. The question is whether, in doing so, they conveyed more certainty and knowledge than was justified, or created tests it would be impossible for Iraq to meet. That is of particular concern in relation to the evidence in Section 4.1 on two key issues.
515. First, the estimates of the weapons and material related to Iraq’s chemical and biological warfare programmes for which UNSCOM had been unable to account were based on extrapolations from UNSCOM records. Officials explicitly advised that it was “inherently difficult to arrive at precise figures”. In addition, it was acknowledged that neither UNSCOM nor the UK could be certain about either exactly what had existed or what Iraq had already destroyed.
516. The revised estimates announced by Mr Straw on 2 May were increasingly presented in Government statements as the benchmark against which Iraq should be judged.
517. Second, the expert MOD examination of issues in late March 2002 exposed the difficulties Iraq would have to overcome before it could acquire a nuclear weapon. That included the difficulty of acquiring suitable fissile material from the “black market”.
- ↑ Minute McDonald to Ricketts, 11 March 2002, ‘Iraq’.
