The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
538. But the deliberate selection of a formulation which grounded the statement in what
Mr Blair believed, rather than in the judgements which the JIC had actually reached in its
assessment of the intelligence, indicates a distinction between his beliefs and the JIC’s
actual judgements.
539. That is supported by the position taken by the JIC and No.10 officials at the time, and in the evidence offered to the Inquiry by some of those involved.
540. The assessed intelligence had not established beyond doubt that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons. The Executive Summary of the dossier stated that the JIC judged that Iraq had “continued to produce chemical and biological agents”. The main text of the dossier said that there had been “recent” production. It also stated that Iraq had the means to deliver chemical and biological weapons. It did not say that Iraq had continued to produce weapons.
541. Nor had the assessed intelligence established beyond doubt that efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued. The JIC stated in the Executive Summary of the dossier that Iraq had:
• made covert attempts “to acquire technology and materials which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons”;
• “sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite having no active nuclear programme that would require it”; and
• “recalled specialists to work on its nuclear programme”.
542. But the dossier made clear that, as long as sanctions remained effective, Iraq could not produce a nuclear weapon.
543. These conclusions draw on the evidence from the JIC Assessments at the time and the Executive Summary of the dossier, which are set out in Section 4.2. They do not rely on hindsight.
544. The JIC itself should have made that position clear because its ownership of the dossier, which was intended to inform a highly controversial policy debate, carried with it the responsibility to ensure that the JIC’s integrity was protected.
545. The process of seeking the JIC’s views, through Mr Scarlett, on the text of the Foreword shows that No.10 expected the JIC to raise any concerns it had.
546. The firmness of Mr Blair’s beliefs, despite the underlying uncertainties, is important in considering how the judgements in the Foreword would have been interpreted by Cabinet in its discussions on 23 September and by Parliament.
547. In his statement to Parliament on 24 September and in his answers to subsequent questions, Mr Blair presented Iraq’s past, current and potential future capabilities as evidence of the severity of the potential threat from Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction; and that, at some point in the future, that threat would become a reality.
